9 ideas
19400 | Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: From the conflict of all the possibles demanding existence, this at once follows, that there exists that series of things by which as many of them as possible exist. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.91) | |
A reaction: I'm in tune with a lot of Leibniz, but my head swims with this one. He seems to be a Lewisian about possible worlds - that they are concrete existing entities (with appetites!). Could Lewis include Leibniz's idea in his system? |
19401 | God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The sufficient reason for God's choice can be found only in the fitness (convenance) or in the degree of perfection that the several worlds possess. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92) | |
A reaction: The 'fitness' of a world and its 'perfection' seem very different things. A piece of a jigsaw can have wonderful fitness, without perfection. Occasionally you get that sinking feeling with metaphysicians that they just make it up. |
14804 | Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Chance is the name for some law that is unknown to us? If you say 'each die moves under the influence of precise mechanical laws', it seems to me it is not these laws which made the tie turn up sixes, for the laws act the same when other throws come up. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Doctrine of Necessity Examined [1892], p.333) |
19402 | The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The actual universe is the collection of the possibles which forms the richest composite. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92) | |
A reaction: 'Richest' for Leibniz means a maximum combination of existence, order and variety. It's rather like picking the best starting team from a squad of footballers. |
14805 | Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Among some of the lower organisms, it is a moot point with biologists whether there be anything which ought to be called death. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Doctrine of Necessity Examined [1892], p.334) | |
A reaction: The point, presumably, is that one phase of an organisms moves into another, and the 'individuals' are not distinct enough for their 'death' to be a significant transition. A nicely mind-expanding thought. |
20759 | Feelings are prior to intelligence; we should be content to live with our simplest feelings [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: To exist is to feel, our feeling is undoubtedly earlier than our intelligence, and we had feelings before we had ideas. …Let us be simpler and less pretentious; let us be content with the first feelings we experience in ourselves. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Emile: treatise on education [1762], p.210), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 6 'Moods' | |
A reaction: Beginning of the sentimental movement, and precursor to romanticism, but here seen as the basis for the existentialist concept of authenticity. Wallowing in emotions doesn't appeal to me, but you have to make space for them. Rousseau loved walking. |
19854 | We all owe labour in return for our keep, and every idle citizen is a thief [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: In a society where a man has to live at others' expense, he owes in labour the price of his keep; and that is without exception. Work, then, is an indispensable social obligation. Rich or poor, powerful or weak, every idle citizen is a thief. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Emile: treatise on education [1762], Bk III) | |
A reaction: Presumably rich landowners who live on rents can justify their position by good husbandry, at a higher level than tilling the soil. But Bertie Wooster won't last long in Rousseau's new world. This is a big challenge to the welfare state. |
14806 | If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The mechanical philosopher leaves the whole specification of the world utterly unaccounted for, which is pretty nearly as bad as to baldly attribute it to chance. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Doctrine of Necessity Examined [1892], p.337) | |
A reaction: If now complete is even remotely available, then that doesn't seem to matter too much, but if there is one message modern physics teaches philosophy, it is that we should not give up on trying to answer the deeper questions. |
14803 | The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Try to verify any law of nature, and you will find that the more precise your observations, the more certain they will be to show irregular departures from the law. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Doctrine of Necessity Examined [1892], p.331) | |
A reaction: This nicely encapsulates modern doubts about whether the so-called 'laws' of nature actually capture what is going on in the real world. |