Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Aristotle and Descartes on Matter', 'Real Natures and Familiar Objects' and 'True to the Facts'

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7 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences [Davidson, by Dummett]
     Full Idea: Davidson, by contrast to Frege, has taken truth as attaching to linguistic items, that is, to actual or hypothetical token sentences.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (True to the Facts [1969]) by Michael Dummett - Truth and the Past 1
     A reaction: My personal notion of truth is potentially applicable to animals, so this doesn't appeal to me. I am happy to think of animals as believing simple propositions that never get as far as language, and being right or wrong about them.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Properties only have identity in the context of their contraries [Elder]
     Full Idea: The very being, the identity, of any property consists at least in part in its contrasting as it does with its own proper contraries.
     From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 2.4)
     A reaction: See Elder for the details of this, but the idea that properties can only be individuated contextually sounds promising.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Maybe we should give up the statue [Elder]
     Full Idea: Some contemporary metaphysicians infer that one of the objects must go, namely, the statue.
     From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 7.2)
     A reaction: [He cites Zimmerman 1995] This looks like a recipe for creating a vast gulf between philosophers and the rest of the population. If it is right, it makes the true ontology completely useless in understanding our daily lives.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
The loss of an essential property means the end of an existence [Elder]
     Full Idea: The loss of any essential property must amount to the end of an existence.
     From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 3)
     A reaction: This is orthodoxy for essentialists, and I presume that Aristotle would agree, but I have a problem with the essence of a great athlete, who then grows old. Must we say that they lose their identity-as-an-athlete?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages [Elder]
     Full Idea: Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages.
     From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 2.2)
     A reaction: Elder proposes this as his test for the essentialness of a property - his Test of Flanking Uniformities. A nice idea.
Essential properties are bound together, and would be lost together [Elder]
     Full Idea: The properties of any essential nature are bound together....[122] so any case in which one of our envisioned familiar objects loses one of its essential properties will be a case in which it loses several.
     From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 3)
     A reaction: This sounds like a fairly good generalisation rather than a necessary truth. Is there a natural selection for properties, so that only the properties which are able to bind to others to form teams are able to survive and flourish?
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter is nothing when it is at rest [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Primary matter is nothing if considered at rest.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Aristotle and Descartes on Matter [1671], p.90)
     A reaction: This goes with Leibniz's Idea 13393, that activity is the hallmark of existence. No one seems to have been able to make good sense of prime matter, and it plays little role in Aristotle's writings.