10 ideas
13795 | Properties only have identity in the context of their contraries [Elder] |
Full Idea: The very being, the identity, of any property consists at least in part in its contrasting as it does with its own proper contraries. | |
From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 2.4) | |
A reaction: See Elder for the details of this, but the idea that properties can only be individuated contextually sounds promising. |
13798 | Maybe we should give up the statue [Elder] |
Full Idea: Some contemporary metaphysicians infer that one of the objects must go, namely, the statue. | |
From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 7.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Zimmerman 1995] This looks like a recipe for creating a vast gulf between philosophers and the rest of the population. If it is right, it makes the true ontology completely useless in understanding our daily lives. |
13797 | The loss of an essential property means the end of an existence [Elder] |
Full Idea: The loss of any essential property must amount to the end of an existence. | |
From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 3) | |
A reaction: This is orthodoxy for essentialists, and I presume that Aristotle would agree, but I have a problem with the essence of a great athlete, who then grows old. Must we say that they lose their identity-as-an-athlete? |
13794 | Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages [Elder] |
Full Idea: Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages. | |
From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Elder proposes this as his test for the essentialness of a property - his Test of Flanking Uniformities. A nice idea. |
14633 | How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson] |
Full Idea: On a friendly reading of Quine, there is nothing to make the difference between a table's being contingently plastic and its being essentially plastic. | |
From: Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 5) | |
A reaction: This is, of course, the dreaded modern usage of 'essential' to just mean 'necessary' and nothing more. In my view, there may be a big problem with knowing whether a problem is necessary, but knowing whether it is essential is much easier. |
14635 | An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson] |
Full Idea: On the possible world's account, x's being essentially F is nothing more nor less than x's being F in every world in which it appears. | |
From: Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 6) | |
A reaction: There you go - 'true in every possible world' is the definition of metaphysical necessity, not the definition of essence. Either get back to Aristotle, or stop (forever!) talking about 'essence'! |
13796 | Essential properties are bound together, and would be lost together [Elder] |
Full Idea: The properties of any essential nature are bound together....[122] so any case in which one of our envisioned familiar objects loses one of its essential properties will be a case in which it loses several. | |
From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 3) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly good generalisation rather than a necessary truth. Is there a natural selection for properties, so that only the properties which are able to bind to others to form teams are able to survive and flourish? |
14632 | Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson] |
Full Idea: The unfriendly response to Quine's objection to essentialism is that it conflates the de re and the de dicto. The friendly response is that behind that conflation is a real epistemological problem for essentialism. | |
From: Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: He cites Richard Cartwright 1968 for the friendly response. The epistemological question is how we can know the essentialness of an essence. |
14631 | How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson] |
Full Idea: If something is offered as a candidate necessary a posteriori truth, how could we show that it is necessary, in the face of the fact that it takes investigation to show that it is true, and so, in some sense, it might have turned out to be false? | |
From: Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: This is the topic of his paper, which he compares with how we can know that essences are essential. |
19399 | Prime matter is nothing when it is at rest [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Primary matter is nothing if considered at rest. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Aristotle and Descartes on Matter [1671], p.90) | |
A reaction: This goes with Leibniz's Idea 13393, that activity is the hallmark of existence. No one seems to have been able to make good sense of prime matter, and it plays little role in Aristotle's writings. |