12 ideas
| 15086 | Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Maybe peaceful co-existence between absolute logical necessity and absolute metaphysical necessity can be secured, ..and absolute necessity is their union. ...However, a truth would then qualify as absolutely necessary in two quite different ways. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 4) | |
| A reaction: Hale is addressing a really big question for metaphysic (absolute necessity) which others avoid. In the end he votes for rejecting 'metaphysical' necessity. I am tempted to vote for rejecting logical necessity (as being relative). 'Absolute' is an ideal. |
| 8261 | Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale] |
| Full Idea: It might be metaphysically necessary that p but logically possible that not-p, so that metaphysical necessity is not, after all, absolute. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996]), quoted by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 1.5 | |
| A reaction: Lowe presents this as dilemma, but it sounds fine to me. Flying pigs etc. have no apparent logical problems, but I can't conceive of a possible world where pigs like ours fly in a world like ours. Earthbound pigs may be metaphysically necessary. |
| 15081 | A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale] |
| Full Idea: One type of necessity may be said to be 'stronger' than another when the first always entails the second, but not conversely. This will obtain only if the possibility of the first is weaker than the possibility of the second. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 1) | |
| A reaction: Thus we would normally say that if something is logically necessary (a very strong claim) then it will have to be naturally necessary. If something is naturally possible, then clearly it will have to be logically possible. Sounds OK. |
| 15080 | 'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Necessity is 'relative' if a claim of φ-necessary that p just claims that it is a logical consequence of some statements Φ that p. We have a 'strong' version if we add that the statements in Φ are all true, and a 'weak' version if not. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 1) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure about 'logical' consequence here. It may be necessary that a thing be a certain way in order to qualify for some category (which would be 'relative'), but that seems like 'sortal' necessity rather than logical. |
| 15082 | Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Friends of metaphysical necessity would want to hold that when it is metaphysically necessary that p, there is no good sense of 'possible' (except, perhaps, an epistemic one) in which it is possible that not-p. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 2) | |
| A reaction: We might want to say which possible worlds this refers to (and presumably it won't just be in the actual world). The normal claim would refer to all possible worlds. Adding a '...provided that' clause moves it from absolute to relative necessity. |
| 15085 | 'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale] |
| Full Idea: 'Broadly' logical necessities are propositions whose truth derives entirely from the concepts involved in them (together, of course, with relevant structure). | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 3) | |
| A reaction: Is the 'logical' part of this necessity bestowed by the concepts, or by the 'structure' (which I take to be a logical structure)? |
| 15088 | Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The logical necessities can be taken to be the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], p.10) | |
| A reaction: This is part of his story of essences giving rise to necessities. His proposal sounds narrow, but logical concepts may have the highest degree of generality which it is possible to have. It must be how the concepts connect that causes the necessities. |
| 15087 | Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Conceptual necessities can be taken to be propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all concepts. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], p.9) | |
| A reaction: Fine endorse essences for these concepts. Could we then come up with a new concept which contradicted all the others, and destroyed the necessity? Yes, presumably. Presumably witchcraft and astrology are full of 'conceptual necessities'. |
| 5049 | Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: An intelligent being's pleasure is simply the perception of beauty, order and perfection. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §18) | |
| A reaction: Leibniz seems to have inherited this from the Greeks, especially Pythagoras and Plato. Buried in Leibniz's remark I see the Christian fear of physical pleasure. He should have got out more. Must an intelligent being always be intelligent? |
| 21096 | The only purpose of government is to administer justice, which brings security [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Man is engaged to establish political society in order to administer justice, without which there could be no peace among them, nor safety, nor mutual intercourse. ...Government has no other purpose but the distribution of justice. | |
| From: David Hume (Of the Origin of Government [1750], p.28) | |
| A reaction: The need for a society in order to ensure mutual intercourse sounds like Hobbes, and a pessimism about trust. By 'justice' he means the administration of law. |
| 5048 | Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Perfection is simply quantity of reality. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §11) | |
| A reaction: An interesting claim, but totally beyond my personal comprehension. I presume he inherited 'quantity of reality' from Plato, e.g. as you move up the Line from shadows to Forms you increase the degree of reality. I see 'real' as all-or-nothing. |
| 5050 | Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Evils themselves serve a greater good, and the fact that pains are found in minds is necessary if they are to reach greater pleasures. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §23) | |
| A reaction: How much pain is needed to qualify for the 'greater pleasures'? Some people receive an awful lot. I am not sure exactly how an evil can 'serve' a greater good. Is he recommending evil? |