Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'True Method in Philosophy and Theology', 'Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics' and 'Proof of an External World'

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4 ideas

3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth

14713	Truth in a scenario is the negation in that scenario being a priori incoherent [Chalmers]
	Full Idea: The epistemic 1-intension for a sentence S is True at a scenario W iff (W and not-S) is a priori incoherent.
	From: David J.Chalmers (Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics [2004], p.180-4), quoted by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics
	A reaction: See Two-Dimensional Semantics (in 'Language') and Chalmers for the background to this idea. I love the coherence view of justification, but get a bit nervous when people start defining truth in that way.

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence

19393	What is not active is nothing [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: We can now show from the inner truths of metaphysics that what is not active is nothing.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (True Method in Philosophy and Theology [1686], p.64)
	A reaction: This is Leibniz's rebellion against the Cartesian idea that all that matters for natural existence is spatial extension. I agree (tentatively) with Leibniz's vision of nature here. Modern physics reveals a seething turmoil beneath the placid exterior.

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty

6349	I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand' [Moore,GE]
	Full Idea: I can prove now that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, 'Here is one hand', and adding, as I gesture with the left, 'and here is another'.
	From: G.E. Moore (Proof of an External World [1939], p.1)
	A reaction: The words need to be spoken, presumably, so that what he is doing fits into the linguistic conventions of what will normally be accepted as a proof. In fact, just holding the hand up seems enough. The proof begs the question of virtual reality.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities

14712	A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false [Chalmers]
	Full Idea: The Core Thesis for rationalist 2D semantics is that for any sentence S, S is apriori iff S has a necessary 1-intension. (That is, there is no possible way the world might be that, if it actually obtained, would make S false).
	From: David J.Chalmers (Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics [2004], p.165), quoted by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics 2.3.2
	A reaction: [The parenthesis is by Schroeter] A '1-intension' is defined by a diagonal on a 2D semantic matrix. Chalmers defends conceivability as the guide to possibility. This is a very traditional view of the a priori, expressed in modern terms.