Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Motion', 'Action, Reasons and Causes' and 'Cours d'Analyse'

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12 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals

18085	Values that approach zero, becoming less than any quantity, are 'infinitesimals' [Cauchy]
	Full Idea: When the successive absolute values of a variable decrease indefinitely in such a way as to become less than any given quantity, that variable becomes what is called an 'infinitesimal'. Such a variable has zero as its limit.
	From: Augustin-Louis Cauchy (Cours d'Analyse [1821], p.19), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 10.4
	A reaction: The creator of the important idea of the limit still talked in terms of infinitesimals. In the next generation the limit took over completely.

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / l. Limits

18084	When successive variable values approach a fixed value, that is its 'limit' [Cauchy]
	Full Idea: When the values successively attributed to the same variable approach indefinitely a fixed value, eventually differing from it by as little as one could wish, that fixed value is called the 'limit' of all the others.
	From: Augustin-Louis Cauchy (Cours d'Analyse [1821], p.19), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 10.4
	A reaction: This seems to be a highly significan proposal, because you can now treat that limit as a number, and adds things to it. It opens the door to Cantor's infinities. Is the 'limit' just a fiction?

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive

7949	Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
	Full Idea: Davidson points out that we can only make sense of patterns of behaviour such as excuses if events can have more than one description. So I flip the light switch, turn on the light, illuminate the room, and alert a prowler, but I do only one thing.
	From: report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.5
	A reaction: We can distinguish an event as an actual object, and as an intentional object. We can probably individuate intentional events quite well (according to our interests), but actual 'events' seem to flow into one another and overlap.

20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action

20020	If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
	Full Idea: Davidson (1980 ess 1) agreed with Anscombe that if a person Fs by G-ing, then her act F = her act G. For example, if someone accidentally alerts a burglar, by deliberately turning on a light, by flipping a switch, these are all the same action.
	From: report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 1.2
	A reaction: I would have thought there was obviously a strong conventional element in individuating actions, depending on interest. An electrician is only interest in whether the light worked. The police are only interested in the disturbance of the burglar.

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions

20072	We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
	Full Idea: The early Davidson championed the approach that we explain the idea of having an intention by providing an account of what it is to act with an intention.
	From: report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Rowland Stout - Action 7 'Conclusion'
	A reaction: This eliminates the distinction between a prior intention, and the intention that maintains a process such as speech. It sounds almost behaviourist.

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs

20045	Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson]
	Full Idea: Whenever someone does something for a reason he can be characterised as (a) having some sort of pro attitude towards action of a certain kind, and (b) believing (or knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering) that his action is of that kind.
	From: Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963], p.3-4), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 3 'The belief-'
	A reaction: This is the earlier Davidson roughly endorsing the traditional belief-desire account of action. He is giving a reductive account of reasons. Deciding reasons were not reducible may have led him to property dualism.

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes

23734	The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
	Full Idea: Davidson argues that the best interpretation of the teleological character of reason explanations is an intepretation in causal terms.
	From: report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Michael Smith - The Moral Problem 4.4
	A reaction: That is, this is the explanation of someone doing something 'because' they have this reason (rather than happening to have a reason). Smith observes that other mental states (such as beliefs) may also have this causal power.

23737	Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
	Full Idea: Only the Humean theory is able to make sense of reason explanation as a species of teleological explanation, and one may accept that reason explanations are teleological without accepting that they are causal.
	From: comment on Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Michael Smith - The Moral Problem 4.6
	A reaction: That is, reasons can give a purpose to an action, and thereby motivate it, without actually causing it. I agree with Smith. I certainly don't (usually, at least) experience reasons as directly producing my actions. Hume says desires are needed.

20075	Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
	Full Idea: In Davidson's earlier approach, intentional action requires causation by reasons.
	From: report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Rowland Stout - Action 8 'Weakness'
	A reaction: A very Kantian idea, and one that seems to bestow causal powers on something which I take to be highly abstract. Thus Davidson was wrong (but in a nice way).

6664	Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]
	Full Idea: It can be argued (by Davidson) that far from it being the case that reasons for and causes of action are quite distinct, reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons.
	From: report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
	A reaction: Lowe argues against this view. The rival views to Davidson would be either that reasons are no more than desires-plus-beliefs in disguise, or that the will causes actions, and strong reasons carry a great weight with the will. I like the will.

3395	Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]
	Full Idea: Davidson defends the simple thesis that the reason for which an action is done is the one that causes it, …which means that agency is possible only if mental causation is possible.
	From: report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.127

27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity

12709	Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: In reality motion is not something absolute, but consists in relation.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Motion [1677], A6.4.1968), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
	A reaction: It is often thought that motion being relative was invented by Einstein, but Leibniz wholeheartedly embraced 'Galilean relativity', and refused to even consider any absolute concept of motion. Acceleration is a bit trickier than velocity.