Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Motion', 'Intending' and 'works'

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4 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
10994 Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Stalnaker, by Read]
     Full Idea: Stalnaker proposes that a conditional is true if its consequent is true in the minimal revision in which the antecedent is true, that is, in the most similar possible world in which the antecedent is true.
     From: report of Robert C. Stalnaker (works [1970]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.3
     A reaction: A similar account of counterfactuals was taken up by Lewis to give a (rather dubious) account of causation.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20076 An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson]
     Full Idea: We can identify an intentional action ...with an all-out conditional judgement that the action is desirable. ...In the case of pure intending, I now suggest that the intention simply is an all-out judgement.
     From: Donald Davidson (Intending [1978], p.99), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 8 'Davidson's'
     A reaction: 'Pure' intending seems to be what Stout calls 'prior' intending, which is clearer. This still strikes me as obviously false. I judge that it is desirable that I make a cup of coffee, but secretly I'm hoping someone else will make it for me.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20024 Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: Later Davidson dropped his reductive treatment of intentions (in terms of 'pro-attitudes' and other beliefs), and accepted that intentions are irreducible, and distinct from pro-attitudes.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (Intending [1978]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 2
     A reaction: Only a philosopher would say that intentions cannot be reduced to something else. Since I have a very physicalist view of the mind, I incline to reduce them to powers and dispositions of physical matter.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
12709 Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: In reality motion is not something absolute, but consists in relation.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Motion [1677], A6.4.1968), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
     A reaction: It is often thought that motion being relative was invented by Einstein, but Leibniz wholeheartedly embraced 'Galilean relativity', and refused to even consider any absolute concept of motion. Acceleration is a bit trickier than velocity.