Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Motion', 'Summa' and 'There is no question of physicalism'

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7 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism

7855	Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau]
	Full Idea: It is sometimes contended that the whole idea of materialism is somehow empty, on the grounds that there is no proper way to characterize the 'physical' realm.
	From: report of DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.1
	A reaction: [Papineau also cites Gabriel Segal] I agree with Papineau in rejecting this. Uncertainties about quantum states do not pose a problem, and the position tends to have an implicit dualism buried in it somewhere.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance

16616	Substances 'substand' (beneath accidents), or 'subsist' (independently) [Eustachius]
	Full Idea: It is proper to substance both to stretch out or exist beneath accidents, which is to substand, and to exist per se and not in another, which is to subsist.
	From: Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], I.1.3b.1.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 06.2
	A reaction: This reflects Aristotle wavering between 'ousia' being the whole of a thing, or the substrate of a thing. In current discussion, 'substance' still wavers between a thing which 'is' a substance, and substance being the essence.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism

16585	Prime matter is free of all forms, but has the potential for all forms [Eustachius]
	Full Idea: Everyone says that prime matter, considered in itself, is free of all forms and at the same time is open to all forms - or, that matter is in potentiality to all forms.
	From: Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], III.1.1.2.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1
	A reaction: This is the notorious doctrine developed to support the hylomorphic picture derived from Aristotle. No one could quite figure out what prime matter was, so it faded away.

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation

6120	Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane]
	Full Idea: The problem thoughts pose for causation is that causation depends directly only on intrinsic properties, whereas the causal powers of token thoughts depend on their contents, which are not intrinsic.
	From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.194)
	A reaction: This, as we find later in the paper, depends on an externalist account of thoughts. Could a relational property not be causal? Edinburgh's being wetter than London is caused by its being further north?

17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism

6121	There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane]
	Full Idea: There are many psychophysical laws, linking sensations to non-mental features of those who have them; the industries of anaesthetics, scents, narcotics, sweeteners, coloured paints, loudspeakers and soft cushions depend on them.
	From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.198)
	A reaction: It may be expressing it a little strongly to call these 'laws', but they are certainly reliable regularities, and they are probably enough to undermine Davidson's claim that such laws don't exist.

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique

6122	No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane]
	Full Idea: Neither laws nor causation nor claims of supervenience (the last refuge of the physicalist) deprive psychology of the ontological authority of non-mental science.
	From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.203)
	A reaction: There is no need to defend the practice of psychologists (or garden designers) from the depradations of bandit physicalists. But what is the ontology of psychology if it isn't dualist or physicalist?

27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity

12709	Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: In reality motion is not something absolute, but consists in relation.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Motion [1677], A6.4.1968), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
	A reaction: It is often thought that motion being relative was invented by Einstein, but Leibniz wholeheartedly embraced 'Galilean relativity', and refused to even consider any absolute concept of motion. Acceleration is a bit trickier than velocity.