9 ideas
| 15549 | If it were true that nothing at all existed, would that have a truthmaker? [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: If there was absolutely nothing at all, then it would have been true that there was nothing. Would there have been a truthmaker for this truth? | |
| From: David Lewis (A world of truthmakers? [1998], p.220) | |
| A reaction: This is a problem for Lewis's own claim that 'truth supervenes on being', as well as the more restricted truthmakers invoked by Armstrong. |
| 13195 | To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: A house would be badly explained if we were to describe only the arrangement of its parts, but not its use. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.255) | |
| A reaction: This must partly fall under pragmatics (i.e. what the enquirer is interested in). But function plays a genuine role in artefacts, and also in evolved biological organs. |
| 4894 | I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way [Perry on Jackson] |
| Full Idea: I say Mary knows an old fact in a new way, but I do not find a new bit of knowledge and a new fact. | |
| From: comment on Frank Jackson (What Mary Didn't Know [1986]) by John Perry - Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness §7.3 | |
| A reaction: This seems roughly the right way to attack Jackson's 'knowledge argument', by asking exactly what he means by 'knowledge'. It is hard to see how 'qualia' can be both the means of acquiring knowledge, and the thing itself. |
| 4895 | Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be [Perry on Jackson] |
| Full Idea: Jackson seems to imply that it isn't fair that all physicalist knowledge can be written down, but not all dualist knowledge can be. | |
| From: comment on Frank Jackson (What Mary Didn't Know [1986]) by John Perry - Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness §7.5 | |
| A reaction: This pinpoints a problem for the 'Mary' example - that Mary's new sight of colour is claimed as 'knowledge', and yet the whole point is that it cannot be expressed in propositions (which seems to leave it as 'procedural' or 'acquaintance' knowledge). |
| 4886 | Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge [Jackson] |
| Full Idea: Mary knows all the physical facts. ..It seems, however, that Mary does not know all there is to know. For when she is let out of the black and white room .. she will learn what it is like to see something red. | |
| From: Frank Jackson (What Mary Didn't Know [1986], §1.4) | |
| A reaction: Jackson is begging the question. A new physical event occurs when the red wavelength stimulates Mary's visual cortex for the first time. For an empiricist raw experience creates knowledge, so it can't BE knowledge. Does Mary acquire a new concept? |
| 13193 | Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Active force should not be thought of as the simple and common potential [potentia] or receptivity to action of the schools. Rather, active force involves an effort [conatus] or striving [tendentia] toward action. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.252) | |
| A reaction: This is why Leibniz is lured into making his active forces more and more animistic, till they end up like proto-minds (though never, remember, conscious and willing minds). |
| 13194 | God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: To say that, in creation, God gave bodies a law for acting means nothing, unless, at the same time, he gave them something by means of which it could happen that the law is followed. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.253) | |
| A reaction: This is the beginning of the modern rebellion against the medieval view of laws as imposed from outside on passive matter. Unfortunately for Leibniz, once you have postulated active internal powers, the external laws become redundant. |
| 13196 | All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: All qualities of bodies .....are in the end reduced [revoco] to forces. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.256) | |
| A reaction: The dots conceal a long qualification, but he is essentially standing by this simple remark. If you substitute the word 'powers' for 'forces', I think that is just about right. |
| 13192 | Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The dynamicon or power [potentia] in bodies is twofold, passive and active. Passive force [vis] constitutes matter or mass [massa], and active force constitutes entelechy or form. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.252) | |
| A reaction: This is explicitly equating the innate force understood in physics with Aristotelian form. The passive force is to explain the resistance of bodies. I like the equation of force with power. He says the entelechy is 'analogous' to a soul. |