Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reply to Foucher', 'What Mary Didn't Know' and 'Letter to Bramhall'

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6 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite

19406	I strongly believe in the actual infinite, which indicates the perfections of its author [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: I am so much for the actual infinite that instead of admitting that nature abhors it, as is commonly said, I hold that it affects nature everywhere in order to indicate the perfections of its author.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reply to Foucher [1693], p.99)
	A reaction: I would have thought that, for Leibniz, while infinities indicate the perfections of their author, that is not the reason why they exist. God wasn't, presumably, showing off. Leibniz does not think we can actually know these infinities.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism

16620	A chair is wood, and its shape is the form; it isn't 'compounded' of the matter and form [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: Nothing can be compounded of matter and form. The matter of a chair is wood; the form is the figure it has, apt for the intended use. Does his Lordship think the chair compounded of the wood and the figure?
	From: Thomas Hobbes (Letter to Bramhall [1650], 4:302), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.1
	A reaction: Aristotle does use the word 'shape' [morphe] when he is discussing hylomorphism, and the statue example seems to support it, but elsewhere the form is a much deeper principle of individuation.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism

16622	Essence is just an artificial word from logic, giving a way of thinking about substances [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: Essence and all other abstract names are words artificial belonging to the art of logic, and signify only the manner how we consider the substance itself.
	From: Thomas Hobbes (Letter to Bramhall [1650], 4:308), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671
	A reaction: I sympathise quite a lot with this view, but not with its dismissive tone. The key question I take to be: if you reject essences entirely (having read too much physics), how are we going to think about entities in the world in future?

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia

4894	I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way [Perry on Jackson]
	Full Idea: I say Mary knows an old fact in a new way, but I do not find a new bit of knowledge and a new fact.
	From: comment on Frank Jackson (What Mary Didn't Know [1986]) by John Perry - Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness §7.3
	A reaction: This seems roughly the right way to attack Jackson's 'knowledge argument', by asking exactly what he means by 'knowledge'. It is hard to see how 'qualia' can be both the means of acquiring knowledge, and the thing itself.

4895	Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be [Perry on Jackson]
	Full Idea: Jackson seems to imply that it isn't fair that all physicalist knowledge can be written down, but not all dualist knowledge can be.
	From: comment on Frank Jackson (What Mary Didn't Know [1986]) by John Perry - Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness §7.5
	A reaction: This pinpoints a problem for the 'Mary' example - that Mary's new sight of colour is claimed as 'knowledge', and yet the whole point is that it cannot be expressed in propositions (which seems to leave it as 'procedural' or 'acquaintance' knowledge).

4886	Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge [Jackson]
	Full Idea: Mary knows all the physical facts. ..It seems, however, that Mary does not know all there is to know. For when she is let out of the black and white room .. she will learn what it is like to see something red.
	From: Frank Jackson (What Mary Didn't Know [1986], §1.4)
	A reaction: Jackson is begging the question. A new physical event occurs when the red wavelength stimulates Mary's visual cortex for the first time. For an empiricist raw experience creates knowledge, so it can't BE knowledge. Does Mary acquire a new concept?