Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Motion', 'On the Essence of Human Freedom' and 'Quodlibeta'

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6 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
16641 Whiteness does not exist, but by it something can exist-as-white [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Whiteness is said to exist not because it subsists in itself, but because by it something has existence-as-white.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Quodlibeta [1267], IX.2.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 10.2
     A reaction: It seems unavoidable to refer to the whiteness as 'it'. It might be called the 'adverbial' theory of properties, as ways of doing something.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
22170 Senses grasp external properties, but the understanding grasps the essential natures of things [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Our imagination and senses grasp only the outer properties of things, not their natures. ...Understanding, however, grasps the very substance and nature of things, so that what is represented in understanding is a likeness of thing's very essence.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Quodlibeta [1267], 8.2.2)
     A reaction: This is exactly the picture I endorse for modern science. Explanation is the path to understanding, and that must venture beyond immediate experience.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
22169 Initial universal truths are present within us as potential, to be drawn out by reason [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: For present in us by nature are certain initial truths everyone knows, in which lie potentially known conclusions our reasons can draw out and make actually known.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Quodlibeta [1267], 8.2.2)
     A reaction: Note that these are truths rather than concepts, but that they have to be 'drawn out' by reason. This is Descartes' view of the matter, where the 'natural light' of reason is needed to articulate what is innate, such as geometry.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
22168 Minds take in a likeness of things, which activates an awaiting potential [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: What the mind takes in is not some material element of the agent, but a likeness of the agent actualising some potential the patient already has. This, for example, is the way our seeing takes in the colour of a coloured body.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Quodlibeta [1267], 8.2.1)
     A reaction: This is exactly right. Descartes agreed. It works for colour, but not (obviously) for cheese graters.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
20956 Ultimately, all being is willing. The nature of primal being is the same as the nature of willing [Schelling]
     Full Idea: In the last and highest instance there is no other being but willing. Willing is primal being, and all the predicates of primal being only fit willing: groundlessness, eternity, being independent of time, self-affirmation.
     From: Friedrich Schelling (On the Essence of Human Freedom [1809], I.7.350), quoted by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy 5 'Reason'
     A reaction: Insofar as this says that 'primal being' must be active in character, I love this idea. Not the rest of the idea though! Bowie says this essay clearly influenced Schopenhauer. It looks as if Nietzsche must be read it too.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
12709 Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: In reality motion is not something absolute, but consists in relation.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Motion [1677], A6.4.1968), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
     A reaction: It is often thought that motion being relative was invented by Einstein, but Leibniz wholeheartedly embraced 'Galilean relativity', and refused to even consider any absolute concept of motion. Acceleration is a bit trickier than velocity.