Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Conspectus libelli (book outline)', 'The Intentionality of Sensation' and 'Letters to Frege'

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9 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox

13365	Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell]
	Full Idea: Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox.
	From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902]) by Graham Priest - The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference §2

10711	Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell]
	Full Idea: Russell's paradox showed that we cannot consistently assume what is sometimes called the 'naïve comprehension principle', namely that every property is collectivizing.
	From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902]) by Michael Potter - Set Theory and Its Philosophy 03.6

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets

9127	Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen]
	Full Idea: Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property.
	From: report of Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902], 1904.12.12) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction 6.1
	A reaction: This is the principle stumbling block to any attempt to explain properties purely in terms of sets. I would say that Russell proved there couldn't be a set for each predicate. You can't glibly equate proper properties with predicates.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates

12699	A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Without soul or form of some kind, a body would have no being, because no part of it can be designated which does not in turn consist of more parts. Thus nothing could be designated in a body which could be called 'this thing', or a unity.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1988), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
	A reaction: The locution 'soul or form' is disconcerting, and you have to spend some time with Leibniz to get the hang of it. The 'soul' is not intelligent, and is more like a source of action and response.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier

12700	Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Substantial form, or soul, is the principle of unity and duration, matter is that of multiplicity and change
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1398-9), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2
	A reaction: Leibniz was a fan of the unfashionable Aristotle, and tried to put a spin on his views consonant with contemporary Hobbesian mechanistic views. Oddly, he likes the idea that 'form' is indestructable, which I don't understand.

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent

12736	If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber]
	Full Idea: Insofar as we have some insight into how God chooses, we can know a priori the laws of nature that God chooses for this best of all possible worlds. In this way, it is possible to have genuine a priori knowledge of contingent truths.
	From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1998-9) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
	A reaction: I think it would be doubtful whether our knowledge of God's choosings would count as a priori. How do we discover them? Ah! We derive God from the ontological argument, and his choosings from the divine perfection implied thereby.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality

7439	The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong]
	Full Idea: Anscombe argued that the qualities involved in sensations are one and all intentional only (and I think this holds even for the bodily sensations).
	From: report of G.E.M. Anscombe (The Intentionality of Sensation [1965]) by David M. Armstrong - Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' p.xxii
	A reaction: Compare Harry Gildersleve's exactly opposite proposal in Idea 7272. I think I am coming round to the Anscombe view, which builds the more mysterious up from the less mysterious. Gildersleve must explain how atomic qualia arise.

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism

12698	Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: I believe that there is in every body a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.2010), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
	A reaction: Note that he never says that there is any intelligence present. This eventually becomes his monadology, but Leibniz is the most obvious post-Greek philosopher to flirt with panpsychism.

18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content

7531	We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell]
	Full Idea: I believe Mont Blanc itself is a component part of what is actually asserted in the proposition 'Mont Blanc is more than 4000 metres high'; we do not assert the thought, which is a private psychological matter, but the object of the thought.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902], 1904.12.12), quoted by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4
	A reaction: This would appear to be pretty much externalism about concepts, given that Russell would accept that other people know much more about Mont Blanc than he does, and their knowledge is included in what he asserts.