Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Conspectus libelli (book outline)', 'Intention' and 'Frege on Knowing the Foundations'

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6 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation

17622	We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge]
	Full Idea: A deeper justification for believing in [mathematical] propositions [apart from pragmatism] lies in finding their place in a logicist proof structure, by understanding the grounds within this structure that support them.
	From: Tyler Burge (Frege on Knowing the Foundations [1998], 3)
	A reaction: This generalises to doubting something until you see what grounds it.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates

12699	A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Without soul or form of some kind, a body would have no being, because no part of it can be designated which does not in turn consist of more parts. Thus nothing could be designated in a body which could be called 'this thing', or a unity.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1988), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
	A reaction: The locution 'soul or form' is disconcerting, and you have to spend some time with Leibniz to get the hang of it. The 'soul' is not intelligent, and is more like a source of action and response.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier

12700	Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Substantial form, or soul, is the principle of unity and duration, matter is that of multiplicity and change
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1398-9), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2
	A reaction: Leibniz was a fan of the unfashionable Aristotle, and tried to put a spin on his views consonant with contemporary Hobbesian mechanistic views. Oddly, he likes the idea that 'form' is indestructable, which I don't understand.

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent

12736	If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber]
	Full Idea: Insofar as we have some insight into how God chooses, we can know a priori the laws of nature that God chooses for this best of all possible worlds. In this way, it is possible to have genuine a priori knowledge of contingent truths.
	From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1998-9) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
	A reaction: I think it would be doubtful whether our knowledge of God's choosings would count as a priori. How do we discover them? Ah! We derive God from the ontological argument, and his choosings from the divine perfection implied thereby.

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism

12698	Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: I believe that there is in every body a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.2010), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
	A reaction: Note that he never says that there is any intelligence present. This eventually becomes his monadology, but Leibniz is the most obvious post-Greek philosopher to flirt with panpsychism.

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions

20041	Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe]
	Full Idea: Intentional actions are those to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is of course that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting.
	From: G.E.M. Anscombe (Intention [1957], p.9), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 2 'Two kinds'
	A reaction: This works better for grand large-scale actions than for small ones, like taking the knife out of the drawer before the fork. Kahnemann nowadays tells us that the reasons we articulate might not be the ones that are operative.