Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Exigency to Exist in Essences', 'Letters to Queen Charlotte' and 'Grundlagen (Foundations of Theory of Manifolds)'

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10 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Cantor developed sets from a progression into infinity by addition, multiplication and exponentiation [Cantor, by Lavine]
     Full Idea: Cantor's development of set theory began with his discovery of the progression 0, 1, ....∞, ∞+1, ∞+2, ..∞x2, ∞x3, ...∞^2, ..∞^3, ...∞^∞, ...∞^∞^∞.....
     From: report of George Cantor (Grundlagen (Foundations of Theory of Manifolds) [1883]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite VIII.2
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Ordinals are generated by endless succession, followed by a limit ordinal [Cantor, by Lavine]
     Full Idea: Ordinal numbers are generated by two principles: each ordinal has an immediate successor, and each unending sequence has an ordinal number as its limit (that is, an ordinal that is next after such a sequence).
     From: report of George Cantor (Grundlagen (Foundations of Theory of Manifolds) [1883]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite III.4
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: It is by the natural light that the axioms of mathematics are recognised. If we take away the same quantity from two equal things, …a thing we can easily predict without having experienced it.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], p.189)
     A reaction: He also says two equal weights will keep a balance level. Plato thinks his slave boy understands halving an area by the natural light, but that is just as likely to be experience. It is too easy to attribut thoughts to a 'natural light'.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: From the conflict of all the possibles demanding existence, this at once follows, that there exists that series of things by which as many of them as possible exist.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.91)
     A reaction: I'm in tune with a lot of Leibniz, but my head swims with this one. He seems to be a Lewisian about possible worlds - that they are concrete existing entities (with appetites!). Could Lewis include Leibniz's idea in his system?
God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The sufficient reason for God's choice can be found only in the fitness (convenance) or in the degree of perfection that the several worlds possess.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92)
     A reaction: The 'fitness' of a world and its 'perfection' seem very different things. A piece of a jigsaw can have wonderful fitness, without perfection. Occasionally you get that sinking feeling with metaphysicians that they just make it up.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: That which is necessary for something does not constitute its essence. Air is necessary for our life, but our life is something other than air.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], 1702)
     A reaction: Bravo. Why can't modern philosophers hang on to this distinction? They seem to think that because they don't believe in traditional essences they can purloin the word for something else. Same with the word 'abstraction'.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Intelligible truth is independent of the truth or of the existence outside us of sensible and material things. ....It is generally true that we only know necessary truths by the natural light [of reason]
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], 1702)
     A reaction: A nice quotation summarising a view for which Leibniz is famous - that there is a tight correlation between necessary truths and our a priori knowledge of them. The obvious challenge comes from Kripke's claim that scientists can discover necessities.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The actual universe is the collection of the possibles which forms the richest composite.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92)
     A reaction: 'Richest' for Leibniz means a maximum combination of existence, order and variety. It's rather like picking the best starting team from a squad of footballers.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: We use the external senses ...to make us know their particular objects ...but they do not make us know what those sensible qualities are ...whether red is small revolving globules causing light, heat a whirling of dust, or sound is waves in air.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], 1702)
     A reaction: These seems to be exactly the concept of secondary qualities which Locke was promoting. They are unreliable information about the objects we perceive. Primary qualities are reliable information. I like that distinction.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: It can be said that there is nothing in the understanding which does not come from the senses, except the understanding itself, or that which understands.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], 1702)
     A reaction: Given that Leibniz is labelled as a 'rationalist', this is awfully close to empiricism. Not Locke's 'tabula rasa' perhaps, but Hume's experiences plus associations. Leibniz has a much loftier notion of understanding and reason than Hume does.