Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Aristotle and Descartes on Matter', 'Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae' and 'Particulars in Particular Clothing'

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4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
     Full Idea: Simons's 'nuclear' option blends features of the substratum and bundle theories. First we have tropes collected by virtue of their internal relations, forming the essential kernel or nucleus. This nucleus then bears the non-essential tropes.
     From: report of Peter Simons (Particulars in Particular Clothing [1994], p.567) by Douglas Edwards - Properties 3.5
     A reaction: [compression of Edwards's summary] This strikes me as being a remarkably good theory. I am not sure of the ontological status of properties, such that they can (unaided) combine to make part of an object. What binds the non-essentials?
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance is that which can act [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I define substance as that which can act.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae [1678], A6.4.1398), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
     A reaction: This is in tune with the notion that to exist is to have causal powers. I find the view congenial, and the middle period of Leibniz's thought, before monads became too spiritual, chimes in with my view.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: All the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by final causes, exactly as if there were no efficient causes; and all the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by efficient causes, as if there were no final causes.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae [1678], A6.4.1403), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
     A reaction: Somewhat speculative (a virtue!), but it is interesting to see him suggesting that there might be two complete and satisfactory explanations, which never touched one another. I can't see Aristotle agreeing with that.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter is nothing when it is at rest [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Primary matter is nothing if considered at rest.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Aristotle and Descartes on Matter [1671], p.90)
     A reaction: This goes with Leibniz's Idea 13393, that activity is the hallmark of existence. No one seems to have been able to make good sense of prime matter, and it plays little role in Aristotle's writings.