Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians', 'Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics' and '26: Oracles in Decline'

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7 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
The sun is always bright; it doesn't become bright when it emerges [Plutarch]
     Full Idea: The sun doesn't become bright when it emerges from the clouds; it always is bright.
     From: Plutarch (26: Oracles in Decline [c.85], §39)
     A reaction: Not an argument, but a nice appeal to common sense, like Russell's example of the cat that disappears behind the furniture and then reappears. To disagree with Plutarch here strikes me as the road to philosophical absurdity.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: A house would be badly explained if we were to describe only the arrangement of its parts, but not its use.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.255)
     A reaction: This must partly fall under pragmatics (i.e. what the enquirer is interested in). But function plays a genuine role in artefacts, and also in evolved biological organs.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Active force should not be thought of as the simple and common potential [potentia] or receptivity to action of the schools. Rather, active force involves an effort [conatus] or striving [tendentia] toward action.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.252)
     A reaction: This is why Leibniz is lured into making his active forces more and more animistic, till they end up like proto-minds (though never, remember, conscious and willing minds).
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: To say that, in creation, God gave bodies a law for acting means nothing, unless, at the same time, he gave them something by means of which it could happen that the law is followed.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.253)
     A reaction: This is the beginning of the modern rebellion against the medieval view of laws as imposed from outside on passive matter. Unfortunately for Leibniz, once you have postulated active internal powers, the external laws become redundant.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: All qualities of bodies .....are in the end reduced [revoco] to forces.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.256)
     A reaction: The dots conceal a long qualification, but he is essentially standing by this simple remark. If you substitute the word 'powers' for 'forces', I think that is just about right.
Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The dynamicon or power [potentia] in bodies is twofold, passive and active. Passive force [vis] constitutes matter or mass [massa], and active force constitutes entelechy or form.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.252)
     A reaction: This is explicitly equating the innate force understood in physics with Aristotelian form. The passive force is to explain the resistance of bodies. I like the equation of force with power. He says the entelechy is 'analogous' to a soul.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
When one element contains the grounds of the other, the first one is prior in time [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: When one of two non-contemporaneous elements contains the grounds for the other, the former is regarded as the antecedent, and the latter as the consequence
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics [1715], p.201)
     A reaction: Bardon cites this passage of Leibniz as the origin of the idea that time's arrow is explained by the direction of causation. Bardon prefers it to the psychological and entropy accounts.