Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Résumé of Metaphysics', 'Human Freedom and Divine choice' and 'Morals and Modals'

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6 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties

13083	The essence is the necessary properties, and the concept includes what is contingent [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Of the essence of a particular thing is what pertains to it necessarily and perpetually; of the concept of an individual thing on the other hand is what pertains to it contingently or per accidens.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Human Freedom and Divine choice [1690], Grua 383), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 3.3.1
	A reaction: This arbitrates on the apparent conflict between his remarks in Idea 13077 and Idea 10382. There seems to be a distinction between the 'concept' of a thing, and the 'complete concept', the latter including the contingent properties.

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity

14629	If we are told the source of necessity, this seems to be a regress if the source is not already necessary [Blackburn]
	Full Idea: If we ask why A must be the case, and A is then proved from B, that explains it if B must be so. If the eventual source cites some truth F, then if F just is so, there is strong pressure to feel that the original necessity has not been explained.
	From: Simon Blackburn (Morals and Modals [1987], 1)
	A reaction: [compressed] Ross Cameron wrote a reply to this which I like. I'm fishing for the idea that essence is the source of necessity (as Kit Fine says), but that essence itself is not necessary (as only I say, apparently!).

14529	If something underlies a necessity, is that underlying thing necessary or contingent? [Blackburn, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
	Full Idea: Blackburn asks of what theorists propose as underlying the necessity of a proposition, the question whether they themselves are conceived as obtaining of necessity or merely contingently.
	From: report of Simon Blackburn (Morals and Modals [1987], p.120-1) by Bob Hale/ Aviv Hoffmann - Introduction to 'Modality' 1
	A reaction: I've seen a reply to this somewhere: I think the thought was that a necessity wouldn't be any less necessary if it had a contingent source, any more than the father of a world champion boxer has to be a world champion boxer.

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure

5049	Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: An intelligent being's pleasure is simply the perception of beauty, order and perfection.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §18)
	A reaction: Leibniz seems to have inherited this from the Greeks, especially Pythagoras and Plato. Buried in Leibniz's remark I see the Christian fear of physical pleasure. He should have got out more. Must an intelligent being always be intelligent?

28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections

5048	Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Perfection is simply quantity of reality.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §11)
	A reaction: An interesting claim, but totally beyond my personal comprehension. I presume he inherited 'quantity of reality' from Plato, e.g. as you move up the Line from shadows to Forms you increase the degree of reality. I see 'real' as all-or-nothing.

29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil

5050	Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Evils themselves serve a greater good, and the fact that pains are found in minds is necessary if they are to reach greater pleasures.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §23)
	A reaction: How much pain is needed to qualify for the 'greater pleasures'? Some people receive an awful lot. I am not sure exactly how an evil can 'serve' a greater good. Is he recommending evil?