21 ideas
| 1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.10) |
| 1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Mind is compelled by necessary truths that can't be regarded as false, but not by contingent ones that might be false. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 12) |
| 1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Good itself as taken in by mind is one truth among others, and truth itself as goal of mind's activity is one good among others. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) |
| 19400 | Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: From the conflict of all the possibles demanding existence, this at once follows, that there exists that series of things by which as many of them as possible exist. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.91) | |
| A reaction: I'm in tune with a lot of Leibniz, but my head swims with this one. He seems to be a Lewisian about possible worlds - that they are concrete existing entities (with appetites!). Could Lewis include Leibniz's idea in his system? |
| 19401 | God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The sufficient reason for God's choice can be found only in the fitness (convenance) or in the degree of perfection that the several worlds possess. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92) | |
| A reaction: The 'fitness' of a world and its 'perfection' seem very different things. A piece of a jigsaw can have wonderful fitness, without perfection. Occasionally you get that sinking feeling with metaphysicians that they just make it up. |
| 19402 | The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The actual universe is the collection of the possibles which forms the richest composite. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92) | |
| A reaction: 'Richest' for Leibniz means a maximum combination of existence, order and variety. It's rather like picking the best starting team from a squad of footballers. |
| 12742 | A whole is just its parts, but there are no smallest parts, so only minds and perceptions exist [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The whole, if it is assumed to be body or matter, is nothing other than all of its parts; but this is absurd, since there aren't any smallest parts. Therefore there really exist only minds and their perceptions. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Calculus Ratiocinator [1679], A6.4.279), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7 | |
| A reaction: Leibniz is sometimes labelled as an 'idealist', but this text is unusual in being so explicit, and he was mainly concerned to explain the reality of individual bodies. Monads were his final attempt to do this, not an attempt to escape into pure minds. |
| 1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: All our knowledge comes through our senses, but that doesn't mean that everything we know is sensed. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 18) |
| 1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Something apprehended to be good and appropriate in any and every circumstance that could be thought of would compel us to will it. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) |
| 1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Nothing can be willed except good, but many and various things are good, and you can't conclude from this that wills are compelled to choose this or that one. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 05) |
| 1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 24) |
| 1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Reasoning powers can entertain opposite objects. Now will is a reasoning power, so will can entertain opposites and is not compelled to embrace one of them. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.x2) |
| 1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The will is not compelled to move, for it doesn't have to want the pleasant things set before it. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 21) |
| 1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Because will moves itself by deliberation - a kind of investigation which doesn't prove some one way correct but examines the alternatives - will doesn't compel itself to will. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) |
| 1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: We are forced to admit that, in any will that is not always willing, the very first movement to will must come from outside, stimulating the will to start willing. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) | |
| A reaction: cf Nietzsche |
| 1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The will is compelled by its ultimate goal (to achieve happiness), but not by the means to achieve it. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.07) |
| 1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The will can avoid actually willing something by avoiding thinking of it, since mental activity is subject to will. In this respect we aren't compelled to will even total happiness, which is the only perfect good. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 07) |
| 1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Will's object is what is good, and so it cannot will anything but what is good. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.06) |
| 1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: If we are not free to will in any way, but are compelled, everything that makes up ethics vanishes: pondering action, exhorting, commanding, punishing, praising, condemning. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) | |
| A reaction: If doesn't require some magical 'free will' to avoid compulsions. All that is needed is freedom to enact your own willing, rather than someone else's. |
| 1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Good applies to all goals, just as truth applies to all forms mind takes in. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) | |
| A reaction: In danger of being tautological, if good is understood as no more than the goal of actions. It seems perfectly possibly to pursue a wicked end, and perhaps feel guilty about it. |
| 1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Even a sufficient cause doesn't always compel its effect, since it can sometimes be interfered with so that its effect doesn't happen | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 15) |