3 ideas
| 6668 | If the present does not exist, then consciousness must be memory of the immediate past [Marshall] |
| Full Idea: Given the paradoxical nature of the 'present' moment, maybe we should understand ALL consciousness as memory, with the split second of the 'specious present' being very vivid and very brief memory, with the rest of the mind remembering in lower degrees. | |
| From: David Marshall (talk [2004]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a highly plausible, and very illuminating remark. For the time paradox, see Ideas 1904 and 5102. Anyone researching consciousness in the brain should think about this, because it will just be a special sort of memory neurons. |
| 22244 | 'Partial reference' is when the subject thinks two objects are one object [Field,H, by Recanati] |
| Full Idea: A subject's thought is about A, but, unbeknownst to the subject, B is substituted for A. Then there is Field's 'partial reference', because the subject's thought is still partially about A, even though they are following B. | |
| From: report of Hartry Field (Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference [1973]) by François Recanati - Mental Files in Flux 2 | |
| A reaction: Used to interpret a well-known case: Wally says of Udo 'he needs a haircut'; Zach looks at someone else and says 'he sure does'. Recanati explains it by mental files. |
| 12709 | Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: In reality motion is not something absolute, but consists in relation. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Motion [1677], A6.4.1968), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3 | |
| A reaction: It is often thought that motion being relative was invented by Einstein, but Leibniz wholeheartedly embraced 'Galilean relativity', and refused to even consider any absolute concept of motion. Acceleration is a bit trickier than velocity. |