Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'True Method in Philosophy and Theology', 'Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference' and 'Semantics for Natural Languages'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
What is not active is nothing [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: We can now show from the inner truths of metaphysics that what is not active is nothing.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (True Method in Philosophy and Theology [1686], p.64)
     A reaction: This is Leibniz's rebellion against the Cartesian idea that all that matters for natural existence is spatial extension. I agree (tentatively) with Leibniz's vision of nature here. Modern physics reveals a seething turmoil beneath the placid exterior.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames]
     Full Idea: Davidson held that knowledge of truth and reference could give us a notion of meaning. He embraced Quine's rejection of analyticity, synonymy and ordinary meaning, and substituted truth and reference, when there was something genuine to capture.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (Semantics for Natural Languages [1970]) by Scott Soames - Philosophy of Language 2.3
     A reaction: I always get a warm glow when anyone suggests that the concept of meaning involves the concept of truth. I largely reject Quine. Davidson made a helpful suggestion!
Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart]
     Full Idea: Davidson's program was to show the underlying structure of natural languages as that of first-order logic.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (Semantics for Natural Languages [1970], 2) by J.J.C. Smart - The Tenseless Theory of Time 2
     A reaction: First order logic just reasons about a domain of objects with predicates attached to them. Language appears to refer to properties and relations as well as objects.
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
'Partial reference' is when the subject thinks two objects are one object [Field,H, by Recanati]
     Full Idea: A subject's thought is about A, but, unbeknownst to the subject, B is substituted for A. Then there is Field's 'partial reference', because the subject's thought is still partially about A, even though they are following B.
     From: report of Hartry Field (Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference [1973]) by François Recanati - Mental Files in Flux 2
     A reaction: Used to interpret a well-known case: Wally says of Udo 'he needs a haircut'; Zach looks at someone else and says 'he sure does'. Recanati explains it by mental files.