3 ideas
9226 | If mathematical theories conflict, it may just be that they have different subject matter [Field,H] |
Full Idea: Unlike logic, in the case of mathematics there may be no genuine conflict between alternative theories: it is natural to think that different theories, if both consistent, are simply about different subjects. | |
From: Hartry Field (Recent Debates on the A Priori [2005], 7) | |
A reaction: For this reason Field places logic at the heart of questions about a priori knowledge, rather than mathematics. My intuitions make me doubt his proposal. Given the very simple basis of, say, arithmetic, I would expect all departments to connect. |
19393 | What is not active is nothing [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We can now show from the inner truths of metaphysics that what is not active is nothing. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (True Method in Philosophy and Theology [1686], p.64) | |
A reaction: This is Leibniz's rebellion against the Cartesian idea that all that matters for natural existence is spatial extension. I agree (tentatively) with Leibniz's vision of nature here. Modern physics reveals a seething turmoil beneath the placid exterior. |
6457 | Sensations are mental, but sense-data could be mind-independent [Vesey] |
Full Idea: Whereas a sensation is by definition mental, a sense-datum might be mind-independent. | |
From: Godfrey Vesey (Collins Dictionary of Philosophy [1990], p.266) | |
A reaction: This seems to be what Russell is getting at in 1912, as he clearly separates sense-data from sensations. Discussions of sense-data always assume they are mental, which may make them redundant - but so might making them physical. |