20 ideas
10825 | The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others [Field,H] |
Full Idea: I suspect that the original purpose of the notion of truth was to aid us in utilizing the utterances of others in drawing conclusions about the world,...so we must attend to its social role, and that being in a position to assert something is what counts. | |
From: Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972], §5) | |
A reaction: [Last bit compressed] This sounds excellent. Deflationary and redundancy views are based on a highly individualistic view of utterances and truth, but we need to be much more contextual and pragmatic if we are to get the right story. |
10820 | In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific [Field,H] |
Full Idea: In the early 1930s many philosophers believed that the notion of truth could not be incorporated into a scientific conception of the world. | |
From: Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972], §3) | |
A reaction: This leads on to an account of why Tarski's formal version was so important, and Field emphasises Tarski's physicalist metaphysic. |
13499 | Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation [Field,H, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Tarski can be viewed as having reduced truth to reference or denotation. | |
From: report of Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 4 |
10818 | Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions [Field,H] |
Full Idea: A proper account of Tarski's truth definition explains truth in terms of three other semantic notions: what it is for a name to denote something, and for a predicate to apply to something, and for a function symbol to be fulfilled by a pair of things. | |
From: Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972]) | |
A reaction: This is Field's 'T1' version, which is meant to spell out what was really going on in Tarski's account. |
10817 | Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions [Field,H] |
Full Idea: It is normally claimed that Tarski defined truth using no undefined semantic terms, but I argue that he reduced the notion of truth to certain other semantic notions, but did not in any way explicate these other notions. | |
From: Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972], §0) |
10819 | Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H] |
Full Idea: Model theory must choose the denotations of the primitives so that all of a group of sentences come out true, so we need a theory of how the truth value of a sentence depends on the denotation of its primitive nonlogical parts, which Tarski gives us. | |
From: Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972], §1) |
10827 | Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers [Field,H] |
Full Idea: In model theory we are interested in allowing a slightly unusual semantics for quantifiers: we are willing to allow that the quantifier not range over everything. | |
From: Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972], n 5) |
16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: Conceptual possibilities are just (metaphysical) possibilities that we can conceive of. | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 1) |
16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: The necessity or contingency of a proposition has nothing to do with our concepts or the meanings of our words. The possibilities would have been the same even if we had never conceived of them. | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 1) | |
A reaction: This sounds in need of qualification, since some of the propositions will be explicitly about words and concepts. Still, I like this idea. |
16421 | Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: Critics say there are no irreducible a posteriori truths. They can be factored into a part that is necessary, but knowable a priori through conceptual analysis, and a part knowable only a posteriori, but contingent. 2-D semantics makes this precise. | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 1) | |
A reaction: [Critics are Sidelle, Jackson and Chalmers] Interesting. If gold is necessarily atomic number 79, or it wouldn't be gold, that sounds like an analytic truth about gold. Discovering the 79 wasn't a discovery of a necessity. Stalnaker rejects this idea. |
16429 | A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: A 'centred' possible world is an ordered triple consisting of a possible world, an individual in the domain of that world, and a time. | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 2) |
10826 | 'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H] |
Full Idea: 'Valence' and 'gene' were perfectly clear long before anyone succeeded in reducing them, but it was their reducibility and not their clarity before reduction that showed them to be compatible with physicalism. | |
From: Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972], §5) |
16428 | Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: Meanings ain't in the head. Putnam's famous slogan actually fits Frege's anti-psychologism better than it fits Purnam's and Burge's anti-individualism. The point is that intensions of any kind are abstract objects. | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 2) | |
A reaction: If intensions are abstract, that leaves (for me) the question of what they are abstracted from. I take it that there are specific brain events that are being abstractly characterised. What do we call those? |
16432 | One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: In 'causal descriptivism' the causal story is built into the description that is the content of the name (and also incorporates a rigidifying operator to ensure that the descriptions that names abbreviate have wide scope). | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 5) | |
A reaction: Not very controversial, I would say, since virtually every fact about the world has a 'causal story' built into it. Must we insist on rigidity in order to have wide scope? |
7615 | Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam] |
Full Idea: In Field's view reference is a 'physicalistic relation', i.e. a complex causal relation between words or mental representations and objects or sets of objects; it is up to physical science to discover what that physicalistic relation is. | |
From: report of Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972]) by Hilary Putnam - Reason, Truth and History Ch.2 | |
A reaction: I wouldn't hold your breath while the scientists do their job. If physicalism is right then Field is right, but physics seems no more appropriate for giving a theory of reference than it does for giving a theory of music. |
16430 | Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: Two-dimensionalism says the necessity of a statement is constituted by the fact that the secondary intensions is a necessary proposition, and their a posteriori character is constituted by the fact that the associated primary intension is contingent. | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 2) | |
A reaction: This view is found in Sidelle 1989, and then formalised by Jackson and Chalmers. I like metaphysical necessity, but I have some sympathy with the approach. The question must always be 'where does this necessity derive from'? |
16431 | In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: On the metasemantic interpretation of the two-dimensional framework, the second dimension is used to represent the metasemantic facts about the relation between a thinker or speaker and the contents of her thoughts or utterances. | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 4) | |
A reaction: I'm struggling to think what facts there might be about the relation between myself and the contents of my thoughts. I'm more or less constituted by my thoughts. |
5049 | Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: An intelligent being's pleasure is simply the perception of beauty, order and perfection. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §18) | |
A reaction: Leibniz seems to have inherited this from the Greeks, especially Pythagoras and Plato. Buried in Leibniz's remark I see the Christian fear of physical pleasure. He should have got out more. Must an intelligent being always be intelligent? |
5048 | Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Perfection is simply quantity of reality. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §11) | |
A reaction: An interesting claim, but totally beyond my personal comprehension. I presume he inherited 'quantity of reality' from Plato, e.g. as you move up the Line from shadows to Forms you increase the degree of reality. I see 'real' as all-or-nothing. |
5050 | Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Evils themselves serve a greater good, and the fact that pains are found in minds is necessary if they are to reach greater pleasures. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §23) | |
A reaction: How much pain is needed to qualify for the 'greater pleasures'? Some people receive an awful lot. I am not sure exactly how an evil can 'serve' a greater good. Is he recommending evil? |