7 ideas
22628 | Substance has to exist, with no intrinsic qualities or relations [McTaggart] |
Full Idea: Something must exist, then, and have qualities, without being itself either a quality or a relation. And this is Substance. | |
From: J.M.E. McTaggart (The Nature of Existence vol.1 [1921], §67), quoted by R.D. Ingthorsson - A Powerful Particulars View of Causation 7.2 | |
A reaction: Ingthorsson quotes this as 'the most extreme analytic view', which is a long way from the Aristotelian view. This is the implausible bare substrate. |
12432 | Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale] |
Full Idea: The dilemma is that to give the ultimate source of any necessity, we must either appeal to something which could not have been otherwise (i.e. is itself necessary), or advert to something which could have been otherwise (i.e. is itself merely contingent). | |
From: Bob Hale (The Source of Necessity [2002], p.301) | |
A reaction: [Hale is summarising Blackburn's view, and going on to disagree with it] Hale looks for a third way, but Blackburn seems to face us with quite a plausible dilemma. |
12434 | Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale] |
Full Idea: We must distinguish between explaining particular necessities and explaining necessity in general; and we ought to distinguish between explaining, in regard to any necessary truth, why it is true, and explaining why it is necessary. | |
From: Bob Hale (The Source of Necessity [2002], p.308) | |
A reaction: Useful. The pluralist view I associate with Fine says we can explain types of necessity, but not necessity in general. If we seek truthmakers, there is a special case of what adds the necessity to the truth. |
12435 | The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale] |
Full Idea: My claim is that there are non-transitive explanations of necessities, where what explains is indeed necessary, but what explains the necessity of the explanandum is not the explanation's necessity, but its truth simpliciter. | |
From: Bob Hale (The Source of Necessity [2002], p.311) | |
A reaction: The big idea is to avoid a regress of necessities. The actual truths he proposes are essentialist. An interesting proposal. It might depend on how one views essences (as giving identity, or causal power) |
12433 | If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale] |
Full Idea: If the alleged necessity, e,g, 2+2=4, really does depend upon a convention governing the use of the words in which we state it, and the existence of that convention is merely a contingent matter, then it can't after all be necessary. | |
From: Bob Hale (The Source of Necessity [2002], p.302) | |
A reaction: [Hale is citing Blackburn for this claim] Hale suggests replies, by keeping truth and meaning separate, and involving laws of logic. Blackburn clearly has a good point. |
12436 | Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that identity-relations among concepts have more to do with explaining how we know that vixens are female foxes etc., than with explaining why it is necessary, and, more generally, with explaining why some necessities are knowable a priori. | |
From: Bob Hale (The Source of Necessity [2002], P.313) | |
A reaction: Hale rejects the conceptual and conventional accounts of necessity, in favour of the essentialist view. This strikes me as a good suggestion of Hale's, since I agree with him about the essentialism. |
19399 | Prime matter is nothing when it is at rest [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Primary matter is nothing if considered at rest. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Aristotle and Descartes on Matter [1671], p.90) | |
A reaction: This goes with Leibniz's Idea 13393, that activity is the hallmark of existence. No one seems to have been able to make good sense of prime matter, and it plays little role in Aristotle's writings. |