Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Identity in Substances and True Propositions', 'Epiphenomenal and supervenient causation' and 'Epiphenomenal Qualia'

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5 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Substances are in harmony, because they each express the one reality in themselves [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Every substance expresses the whole sequence of the universe in accordance with its own viewpoint or relationship to the rest, so that all are in perfect correspondence with one another.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Identity in Substances and True Propositions [1686], p.98)
     A reaction: Thus 'expression' (something like mapping what is exterior) is the mechanism through which God achieves harmony in the universe. Instants of time are said to be successive moments of perfect harmony.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson]
     Full Idea: An ornithological Mary might know everything theoretical about kestrels, but be blind from birth, then have her sight restored. She now knows "That bird eats mice", so visual kestrels must be ontologically distinct from theoretical ones.
     From: comment on Frank Jackson (Epiphenomenal Qualia [1982]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 6.3
     A reaction: A nice reductio, and I think this pinpoints best what is wrong with the knowledge argument. Knowledge, and the means of acquiring it, are two distinct things. When I see x, I don't acquire knowledge of x, AND knowledge of my seeing x.
No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson]
     Full Idea: That Mary "has all the physical information" is not readily imaginable, so no one bothers. They just imagine she knows lots and lots - perhaps everything known today - but that is just a drop in the bucket.
     From: comment on Frank Jackson (Epiphenomenal Qualia [1982]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 12.5
     A reaction: I certainly don't see how we can rule out a priori the possibility that someone who really had all the physical knowledge might be able to infer the phenomenal properties of colour.
Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson]
     Full Idea: It seems obvious that Mary will learn something about the world when she is released from her black-and-white room; but then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete; she had all the physical information, so there is more to have.
     From: Frank Jackson (Epiphenomenal Qualia [1982], §1)
     A reaction: This is Jackson's famous 'knowledge argument', which seems to me misconceived. Since I don't think phenomenal colours are properties of objects (Idea 5456), Mary learns more about herself, and about her means of acquiring knowledge.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
All observable causes are merely epiphenomena [Kim]
     Full Idea: All causal relations involving observable phenomena - all causal relations from daily experience - are cases of epiphenomenal causation.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Epiphenomenal and supervenient causation [1984], §2)