Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Résumé of Metaphysics', 'Theology and Verification' and 'Are Freedom and Equality Compatible?'

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11 ideas

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: An intelligent being's pleasure is simply the perception of beauty, order and perfection.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §18)
     A reaction: Leibniz seems to have inherited this from the Greeks, especially Pythagoras and Plato. Buried in Leibniz's remark I see the Christian fear of physical pleasure. He should have got out more. Must an intelligent being always be intelligent?
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
The right-wing conception of freedom is based on the idea of self-ownership [Cohen,GA]
     Full Idea: The right-wing conception of freedom is, I think, founded on the idea that each person is the morally rightful owner of himself, even if existing legal systems do not acknowledge it. Let us call that the 'self-ownership' thesis.
     From: G.A. Cohen (Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? [1986], 1)
     A reaction: He cites Nozick as articulating this view. At the end Cohen rejects self-ownership, though he agrees that no one would accept that the state could be the owner of your eyes. Do I own my hair after it is cut?
Plenty of people have self-ownership, but still lack autonomy [Cohen,GA]
     Full Idea: Universal self-ownership fails to ensure autonomy, since it tends to produce proletarians, who lack it.
     From: G.A. Cohen (Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? [1986], 3)
     A reaction: The implication is that autonomy is not a property of individuals but a social phenomenon. Self-owning people can still be imprisoned. What about autonomy without self-ownership? A bright slave who is given extensive responsibility?
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
It is doubtful whether any private property was originally acquired legitimately [Cohen,GA]
     Full Idea: It is easy to doubt that much actually existing private property was formed in what anyone could think was a legitimating way.
     From: G.A. Cohen (Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? [1986], 2)
     A reaction: What if I created an artificial island out of unwanted raw materials? What about the first humans to reach some remote territory?
It is plausible that no one has an initial right to own land and natural resources [Cohen,GA]
     Full Idea: One may plausibly say of external things in their initial state, of raw land and natural resources, that no person has a greater right to them than any other does.
     From: G.A. Cohen (Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? [1986], 1)
     A reaction: How about if your group has lived on that plot for fifty generations, and some interlopers arrive and claim part of it. No one thought of 'owning' it till the interlopers arrived. Native Americans and Australians.
Every thing which is now private started out as unowned [Cohen,GA]
     Full Idea: In the prehistory of anything that is now private property there was at least one moment at which something privately unowned was taken into private ownership.
     From: G.A. Cohen (Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? [1986], 2)
     A reaction: He is obviously talking about land and natural resources. Presumably a table which I made and own was always private property, although the land where the trees were grown was not. Though in some communities what I make could be automatically communal.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Perfection is simply quantity of reality.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §11)
     A reaction: An interesting claim, but totally beyond my personal comprehension. I presume he inherited 'quantity of reality' from Plato, e.g. as you move up the Line from shadows to Forms you increase the degree of reality. I see 'real' as all-or-nothing.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / c. Religious Verification
Belief in an afterlife may be unverifiable in this life, but it will be verifiable after death [Hick, by PG]
     Full Idea: Religion is capable of 'eschatological verification', by reaching evidence at the end of life, even though falsification of its claims is never found in this life; a prediction of coming to a Celestial City must await the end of the journey.
     From: report of John Hick (Theology and Verification [1960], III) by PG - Db (ideas)
It may be hard to verify that we have become immortal, but we could still then verify religious claims [Hick, by PG]
     Full Idea: Verification of religious claims after death is only possible if the concept of surviving death is intelligible, and we can understand the concept of immortality, despite difficulties in being certain that we had reached it.
     From: report of John Hick (Theology and Verification [1960], IV) by PG - Db (ideas)
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / d. Religious Falsification
Some things (e.g. a section of the expansion of PI) can be verified but not falsified [Hick, by PG]
     Full Idea: Falsification and verification are not logically equivalent. For example, you might verify the claim that there will be three consecutive sevens in the infinite expansion of PI, but you could never falsify such a claim.
     From: report of John Hick (Theology and Verification [1960], §II) by PG - Db (ideas)
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Evils themselves serve a greater good, and the fact that pains are found in minds is necessary if they are to reach greater pleasures.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §23)
     A reaction: How much pain is needed to qualify for the 'greater pleasures'? Some people receive an awful lot. I am not sure exactly how an evil can 'serve' a greater good. Is he recommending evil?