5 ideas
19727 | Reliabilist knowledge is evidence based belief, with high conditional probability [Comesaņa] |
Full Idea: The best definition of reliabilism seems to be: the agent has evidence, and bases the belief on the evidence, and the actual conditional reliability of the belief on the evidence is high enough. | |
From: Juan Comesaņa (Reliabilism [2011], 4.4) | |
A reaction: This is Comesaņa's own theory, derived from Alston 1998, and based on conditional probabilities. |
19725 | In a sceptical scenario belief formation is unreliable, so no beliefs at all are justified? [Comesaņa] |
Full Idea: If the processes of belief-formation are unreliable (perhaps in a sceptical scenario), then reliabilism has the consequence that those victims can never have justified beliefs (which Sosa calls the 'new evil demon problem'). | |
From: Juan Comesaņa (Reliabilism [2011], 4.1) | |
A reaction: That may be the right outcome. Could you have mathematical knowledge in a sceptical scenario? But that would be different processes. If I might be a brain in a vat, then it's true that I have no perceptual knowledge. |
19726 | How do we decide which exact process is the one that needs to be reliable? [Comesaņa] |
Full Idea: The reliabilist has the problem of finding a principled way of selecting, for each token-process of belief formation, the type whose reliability ratio must be high enough for the belief to be justified. | |
From: Juan Comesaņa (Reliabilism [2011], 4.3) | |
A reaction: The question is which exact process I am employing for some visual knowledge (and how the process should be described). Seeing, staring, squinting, glancing.... This seems to be called the 'generality problem'. |
20921 | How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus] |
Full Idea: How could what is bitter for us be sweet and sour for others, if there is not some determinate nature for them? | |
From: Theophrastus (On the Senses [c.321 BCE], 70) | |
A reaction: The remark is aimed at Democritus. This is part of the general question of how you can even talk about relativism, without attaching stable meanings to the concepts employed. |
12709 | Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In reality motion is not something absolute, but consists in relation. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Motion [1677], A6.4.1968), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3 | |
A reaction: It is often thought that motion being relative was invented by Einstein, but Leibniz wholeheartedly embraced 'Galilean relativity', and refused to even consider any absolute concept of motion. Acceleration is a bit trickier than velocity. |