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All the ideas for 'Conspectus libelli (book outline)', 'Machine Man' and 'German Philosophy 1760-1860'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
Wolff's version of Leibniz dominated mid-18th C German thought [Pinkard]
     Full Idea: The dominant philosophy of mid-eighteenth century Germany was Wolffianism, a codified and almost legalistically organised form of Leibnizian thought.
     From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], Intro)
     A reaction: Kant grew up in this intellectual climate.
Romantics explored beautiful subjectivity, and the re-enchantment of nature [Pinkard]
     Full Idea: Early Romanticism can be seen as the exploration of subjective interiority and as the re-enchantment of nature (as organic). Hegel said they had the idea of a 'beautiful soul', which (he said) either paralysed action, or made them smug.
     From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], 06)
     A reaction: [compressed, inc Note 1] A major dilemma of life is the extent of our social engagement, because it makes life worthwhile, but pollutes the mind with continual conflicts.
The combination of Kant and the French Revolution was an excited focus for German philosophy [Pinkard]
     Full Idea: After the French Revolution, philosophy suddenly became the key rallying point for an entire generation of German intellectuals, who had been reading Kant as the harbinger of a new order.
     From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], Pt II Intro)
     A reaction: Kant was a harbinger because he offered an autonomous status to each individual, rather than being subservient to a social order.
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / d. Nineteenth century philosophy
In Hegel's time naturalism was called 'Spinozism' [Pinkard]
     Full Idea: In Hegel's time the shorthand for the Naturalistic worldview was 'Spinozism'.
     From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], 10)
     A reaction: Spinozism hit Germany like a bomb in 1786, when it was reported that the poet Hölderlin was a fan of Spinoza.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Without soul or form of some kind, a body would have no being, because no part of it can be designated which does not in turn consist of more parts. Thus nothing could be designated in a body which could be called 'this thing', or a unity.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1988), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
     A reaction: The locution 'soul or form' is disconcerting, and you have to spend some time with Leibniz to get the hang of it. The 'soul' is not intelligent, and is more like a source of action and response.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Substantial form, or soul, is the principle of unity and duration, matter is that of multiplicity and change
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1398-9), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2
     A reaction: Leibniz was a fan of the unfashionable Aristotle, and tried to put a spin on his views consonant with contemporary Hobbesian mechanistic views. Oddly, he likes the idea that 'form' is indestructable, which I don't understand.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber]
     Full Idea: Insofar as we have some insight into how God chooses, we can know a priori the laws of nature that God chooses for this best of all possible worlds. In this way, it is possible to have genuine a priori knowledge of contingent truths.
     From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1998-9) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
     A reaction: I think it would be doubtful whether our knowledge of God's choosings would count as a priori. How do we discover them? Ah! We derive God from the ontological argument, and his choosings from the divine perfection implied thereby.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Idealism is the link between reason and freedom [Pinkard]
     Full Idea: Idealism was conceived as a link between reason and freedom.
     From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], 14 Conc)
     A reaction: I'm beginning to see the Romantic era as the Age of Freedom, which followed the Age of Reason. This idea fits that picture nicely. Pinkard says that paradoxes resulted from the attemptl
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
The imagination alone perceives all objects; it is the soul, playing all its roles [La Mettrie]
     Full Idea: The imagination alone perceives; it forms an idea of all objects, with the words and figures that characterise them; thus the imagination is the soul, because it plays all its roles.
     From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.15)
     A reaction: This is not just a big claim for the importance of imagination, in strong opposition to Descartes's rather dismissive view (Idea 1399), but also appears to be the germ of an interesting theory about the nature of personal identity.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I believe that there is in every body a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.2010), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
     A reaction: Note that he never says that there is any intelligence present. This eventually becomes his monadology, but Leibniz is the most obvious post-Greek philosopher to flirt with panpsychism.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
When falling asleep, the soul becomes paralysed and weak, just like the body [La Mettrie]
     Full Idea: The soul and body fall asleep together. The soul slowly becomes paralysed, together with all the body's muscles. They can no longer hold up the weight of the head, while the soul can no longer bear the burden of thought.
     From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.6)
     A reaction: A very nice observation, to place alongside other evidence such as drunkenness and blushing. Personally I find it hard to see why anyone ever believed dualism. You don't need modern brain scans and brain lesion research to see the problem.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
The soul's faculties depend on the brain, and are simply the brain's organisation [La Mettrie]
     Full Idea: All the soul's faculties depend so much on the specific organisation of the brain and of the whole body that they are clearly nothing but that organisation.
     From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.26)
     A reaction: An interesting idea because it suggests that La Mettrie is a functionalist, rather than simply a reductive physicalist.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Man is a machine, and there exists only one substance, diversely modified [La Mettrie]
     Full Idea: Let us conclude boldly that man is a machine and that there is in the whole universe only one diversely modified substance.
     From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.39)
     A reaction: What courage it must have taken to write what now seems a perfectly acceptable and normal view. One day there should be a collective monument to Hobbes, Gassendi, Spinoza, La Mettrie and Hume, who thought so boldly.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
All thought is feeling, and rationality is the sensitive soul contemplating reasoning [La Mettrie]
     Full Idea: Thought is only a capacity to feel, and the rational soul is only the sensitive soul applied to the contemplation of ideas and to reasoning.
     From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.33)
     A reaction: What a very nice idea. La Mettrie wants to bring us closer to animals. Because we can pursue a train of rational thought, it does not follow that we have a faculty called 'rationality'. A dog can follow a clever series of clues that lead to food.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
With wonderful new machines being made, a speaking machine no longer seems impossible [La Mettrie]
     Full Idea: If wonderful machines like Huygens's planetary clock can be made, it would take even more cogs and springs to make a speaking machine, which can no longer be considered impossible, particularly at the hands of a new Prometheus.
     From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.34)
     A reaction: Compare Descartes in Idea 3614. The idea of artificial intelligence does not arise with the advent of computers; it follows naturally from the materialist view of the mind, along with a bit of ambition to build complex machines.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
The sun and rain weren't made for us; they sometimes burn us, or spoil our seeds [La Mettrie]
     Full Idea: The sun was not made in order to heat the earth and all its inhabitants - whom it sometimes burns - any more than the rain was created in order to grow seeds - which it often spoils.
     From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747])
     A reaction: This denial of Aristotelian (and divine) teleology is as much part of the movement against religion, as are concerns about natural evil, and about the weakness of arguments for God's existence. These facts were obvious long before La Mettrie.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
There is no abrupt transition from man to animal; only language has opened a gap [La Mettrie]
     Full Idea: From animals to man there is no abrupt transition. What was man before he invented words and learnt languages? An animal of a particular species, with much less natural instinct than the others.
     From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.13)
     A reaction: This shows how strongly the evolutionary idea was in the air, a century before Darwin proposed a mechanism for it. This thought is the beginning of a very new view of man, and also of a very new view of animals.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
There is no clear idea of the soul, which should only refer to our thinking part [La Mettrie]
     Full Idea: The soul is merely a vain term of which we have no idea and which a good mind should use only to refer to that part of us which thinks.
     From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747])
     A reaction: I have always found the concept of the soul particularly baffling. It seems that it is only believed in to make immortality possible, with no other purpose to the belief, let alone evidence. I suspect that Descartes agreed with La Mettrie on this.