Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Résumé of Metaphysics', 'Theses on Feuerbach' and 'Causation and the Manifestation of Powers'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophers have interpreted the world, but the point is to change it [Marx]
     Full Idea: The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.
     From: Karl Marx (Theses on Feuerbach [1846], §XI)
     A reaction: The 'point' of what? Personally I am more with Aristotle - that the aim is to create a society in which we can all aspire to contemplate like gods. As an interim statement of aim, though, one must respect Marx. But was he a philosopher?
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Whether human thinking can be 'true' must be decided in practice, not theory [Marx]
     Full Idea: The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question; man must prove the truth of his thinking in practice.
     From: Karl Marx (Theses on Feuerbach [1846], §II)
     A reaction: This would appear to be an assertion of the pragmatic view of truth well before Peirce. The obvious objections arise, such as whether falsehood (Plato's 'noble lie') might not have equal practical success, and whether truth might be disastrous.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
Causation seems to be an innate concept (or acquired very early) [Bird]
     Full Idea: There is evidence that the concept of causation is innate, or that we are primed to acquire it very early in life, within months at most.
     From: Alexander Bird (Causation and the Manifestation of Powers [2010], p.167)
     A reaction: Bird doesn't give any references. This is important for our understanding of induction. Creatures seem to learn from a single instance, rather than waiting for habit to be ingrained by many instances. They must infer a cause.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
The authentic self exists at the level of class, rather than the individual [Marx, by Dunt]
     Full Idea: Instead of focusing on the individual, Marxism suggested that the authentic self was at the social level in the form of class.
     From: report of Karl Marx (Theses on Feuerbach [1846]) by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 6
     A reaction: [not sure of the best source in Marx] This idea is expressed here by a defender of liberal individualism. Dunt persuasively attacks any concept of the self as part of some group, rather than as being an individual.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The human essence is not found in individuals but in social relations [Marx]
     Full Idea: The human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual; in its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.
     From: Karl Marx (Theses on Feuerbach [1846], §VI)
     A reaction: This is a key Marxist doctrine, and the central difference from Aristotle. Personally I am more with Aristotle, but the truth obviously lies somewhere in between. Man must be a 'social being', or there wouldn't be any social relations.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: An intelligent being's pleasure is simply the perception of beauty, order and perfection.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §18)
     A reaction: Leibniz seems to have inherited this from the Greeks, especially Pythagoras and Plato. Buried in Leibniz's remark I see the Christian fear of physical pleasure. He should have got out more. Must an intelligent being always be intelligent?
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
The dispositional account explains causation, as stimulation and manifestation of dispositions [Bird]
     Full Idea: The analysis of causation in terms of dispositions provides no conceptual reduction, but it does provide insight into the metaphysics of causation. We then know what causation is - it is the stimulation and manifestation of a disposition.
     From: Alexander Bird (Causation and the Manifestation of Powers [2010], p.167)
     A reaction: I would say that it offers the essence of causation, by giving a basic explanation of it. See Mumford/Lill Anjum on this.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition [Bird]
     Full Idea: The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and condition, ...but when the smoke sets off the fire alarm, the smoke is the cause, whereas the presence of the alarm is just the condition.
     From: Alexander Bird (Causation and the Manifestation of Powers [2010], p.162)
     A reaction: Bird defends the idea that causes are what stimulate dispositions to act.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Perfection is simply quantity of reality.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §11)
     A reaction: An interesting claim, but totally beyond my personal comprehension. I presume he inherited 'quantity of reality' from Plato, e.g. as you move up the Line from shadows to Forms you increase the degree of reality. I see 'real' as all-or-nothing.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religious feeling is social in origin [Marx]
     Full Idea: The "religious sentiment" (discussed by Feuerbach) is itself a social product.
     From: Karl Marx (Theses on Feuerbach [1846], §VII)
     A reaction: Recent brain research has identified a part of the brain which is only active during religious thought and experience. It is easy to produce cynical political accounts of religion, but in its time it was also quite a good scientific account of nature.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Evils themselves serve a greater good, and the fact that pains are found in minds is necessary if they are to reach greater pleasures.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §23)
     A reaction: How much pain is needed to qualify for the 'greater pleasures'? Some people receive an awful lot. I am not sure exactly how an evil can 'serve' a greater good. Is he recommending evil?