8 ideas
| 19400 | Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: From the conflict of all the possibles demanding existence, this at once follows, that there exists that series of things by which as many of them as possible exist. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.91) | |
| A reaction: I'm in tune with a lot of Leibniz, but my head swims with this one. He seems to be a Lewisian about possible worlds - that they are concrete existing entities (with appetites!). Could Lewis include Leibniz's idea in his system? |
| 19401 | God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The sufficient reason for God's choice can be found only in the fitness (convenance) or in the degree of perfection that the several worlds possess. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92) | |
| A reaction: The 'fitness' of a world and its 'perfection' seem very different things. A piece of a jigsaw can have wonderful fitness, without perfection. Occasionally you get that sinking feeling with metaphysicians that they just make it up. |
| 19402 | The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The actual universe is the collection of the possibles which forms the richest composite. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92) | |
| A reaction: 'Richest' for Leibniz means a maximum combination of existence, order and variety. It's rather like picking the best starting team from a squad of footballers. |
| 5319 | Avoid punishment, then get rewards, avoid rejection, avoid guilt, accept contracts, follow conscience [Kohlberg, by Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: Kohlberg's six stages of ethical development are: 1) avoid punishment, 2) obtain rewards, 3) avoid rejection, 4) avoid censure and guilt, 5) recognise contracts, 6) individual conscience. | |
| From: report of Lawrence Kohlberg (works [1969]) by Edmund O. Wilson - On Human Nature p.166 | |
| A reaction: This doesn't throw much light on philosophical problems, but the order of the six stages is interesting. Beware of oversimplification, because a situation can put pressure on any one of these six aspects of morality. |
| 4581 | Virtues and vices are like secondary qualities in perception, found in observers, not objects [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Vice and virtue may be compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects but perceptions in the mind. | |
| From: David Hume (Letters [1739], to Hutcheson 1740) | |
| A reaction: Very revealing about the origin of the is/ought idea, but this is an assertion rather than an argument. Most Greeks treat value as a primary quality of things (e.g. life, harmony, beauty, health). |
| 4580 | All virtues benefit either the public, or the individual who possesses them [Hume] |
| Full Idea: I desire you to consider if there be any quality that is virtuous, without having a tendency either to the public good or to the good of the person who possesses it. | |
| From: David Hume (Letters [1739], to Hutcheson 1739) | |
| A reaction: Obviously this is generally true. How, though, does it benefit the individual to secretly preserve their integrity? I go round to visit a friend to repay a debt; I am told they have died; I quietly leave some money on the table and leave. Why? |
| 4579 | The idea of a final cause is very uncertain and unphilosophical [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Your sense of 'natural' is founded on final causes, which is a consideration that appears to me pretty uncertain and unphilosophical. | |
| From: David Hume (Letters [1739], to Hutcheson 1739) | |
| A reaction: This is the rejection of Aristotelian teleology by modern science. I agree that the notion of utterly ultimate final cause is worse than 'uncertain' - it is an impossible concept. Nevertheless, I prefer Aristotle to Hume. Nature can teach us lessons. |
| 20705 | That events could be uncaused is absurd; I only say intuition and demonstration don't show this [Hume] |
| Full Idea: I never asserted so absurd a proposition as that anything might arise without a cause: I only maintained that our certainty of the falsehood of that proposition proceeded neither from intuition nor from demonstration, but from another source. | |
| From: David Hume (Letters [1739], 1754), quoted by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 5 'God' | |
| A reaction: Since the other source is habit, he is being a bit disingenuous. While rational intuition and demonstration give a fairly secure basis for the universality of causation, mere human habits of expectation give very feeble grounds. |