6 ideas
| 9217 | Modern empirical metaphysics focuses on ontological commitments of discourse, or on presuppositions [Loux/Zimmerman] |
| Full Idea: The empiricist revival of metaphysics came with Quine, who focused on ontological commitments associated with accepting a body of discourse, and Strawson, asking about the presuppositions of our conceptual practices. | |
| From: M Loux / D Zimmerman (Intro to Oxford Hndbk of Metaphysics [2003]) | |
| A reaction: I find myself preferring the British approach. I can discourse about things without ontological commitment, and utter truths about non-existent things. I really yearn, though, for the third way - actually reasoning towards knowing what's out there. |
| 5044 | Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: A multiplicity can only be made up of true unities, ..so I had recourse to the idea of a real and animated point, or an atom of substance which must embrace some element of form or of activity in order to make a complete being. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (New System and Explanation of New System [1696], p.116) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a combination of logical atomism and panpsychism. It has a certain charm, but looks like another example of these rationalist speculators overreaching themselves. |
| 21681 | Given all true atomic propositions, in theory every other truth can thereby be deduced [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Given all true atomic propositions, together with the fact that they are all, every other true proposition can theoretically be deduced by logical methods. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Intro to 2nd ed of Principia Mathematica [1925], p.xv) | |
| A reaction: This is evidently his strongest statement of the ideal underlying logical atomism. The atoms were initially sense-date, but then became atomic propositions saying an object has a property. |
| 5045 | No machine or mere organised matter could have a unified self [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: By means of the soul or form, there is a true unity which is called the 'I' in us; a thing which could not occur in artificial machines, nor in the simple mass of matter, however organised it may be. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (New System and Explanation of New System [1696], p.120) | |
| A reaction: I think the unity of consciousness and the unified Self are different phenomena. A wonderful remark about artificial intelligence for 1696! Note the idea of functionalism contained in 'organised'. Personally I see the brain as a 'mass of matter'. |
| 5046 | The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: I do not admit that the soul does not know bodies, although this knowledge arises without their influencing one another. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (New System and Explanation of New System [1696], Reply 11) | |
| A reaction: He couldn't very well admit this without moving into pure idealism. Presumably it is like "I know her - she'll be in Harrods this morning". I wonder if Satan could steal my body, but my mind continue to believe it was still there? |
| 5043 | To regard animals as mere machines may be possible, but seems improbable [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: It seems to me that the opinion of those who transform or degrade the lower animals into mere machines, although it seems possible, is improbable, and even against the order of things. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (New System and Explanation of New System [1696], p.116) | |
| A reaction: His target is Descartes. 'Against the order of things' seems to beg the question. What IS the order of things? Only a thorough-going dualist would worry about this question, and that isn't me. |