4 ideas
18832 | Mathematical statements and entities that result from an infinite process must lack a truth-value [Dummett] |
Full Idea: On an intuitionistic view, neither the truth-value of a statement nor any other mathematical entity can be given as the final result of an infinite process, since an infinite process is precisely one that does not have a final result. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Elements of Intuitionism (2nd ed) [2000], p.41), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 7.3 | |
A reaction: This is rather a persuasive reason to sympathise with intuitionism. Mathematical tricks about 'limits' have lured us into believing in completed infinities, but actually that idea is incoherent. |
19518 | Evidentialism says justifications supervene on the available evidence [Conee/Feldman] |
Full Idea: Fundamentally Evidentialism is a supervenience thesis, according to which facts about whether or not a person is justified in believing a proposition supervene on facts describing the evidence the person has. | |
From: E Conee / R Feldman (Introduction to 'Evidentialism' [2004], p.1) | |
A reaction: If facts 'describe', does that make them linguistic? That's not how I use 'facts'. A statement of a fact is not the same as the fact. An ugly fact can be beautifully expressed. I am, however, in favour of evidence. |
19519 | Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally [Conee/Feldman] |
Full Idea: In decision theory, there is a view according to which the rational basis for all decisions is evidential. This kind of decision theory is typically contrasted with causal decision theory. | |
From: E Conee / R Feldman (Introduction to 'Evidentialism' [2004], p.3) | |
A reaction: Your Kantian presumably likes rational reflection on evidence, and your modern reductive scientist prefers causality (which doesn't really sound very rational). |
19399 | Prime matter is nothing when it is at rest [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Primary matter is nothing if considered at rest. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Aristotle and Descartes on Matter [1671], p.90) | |
A reaction: This goes with Leibniz's Idea 13393, that activity is the hallmark of existence. No one seems to have been able to make good sense of prime matter, and it plays little role in Aristotle's writings. |