8 ideas
14779 | I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce] |
Full Idea: I do not reason for the sake of my delight in reasoning, but solely to avoid disappointment and surprise. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Criterion of Validity in Reasoning [1903], I) | |
A reaction: Hence Peirce places more emphasis on inductive and abductive reasoning than on deductive reasoning. I have to agree with him. Anyone account of why we reason must have an evolutionary framework. What advantage does reason bestow? It concerns the future. |
14777 | That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Either J and the judgment 'I say that J is true' are the same for all judgments or for none. But if identical, their denials are identical. These are 'J is not true' and 'I do not say that J is true', which are different. No judgment judges itself true. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Criterion of Validity in Reasoning [1903], I) | |
A reaction: If you are going to espouse the Ramseyan redundancy view of truth, you had better make sure you are not guilty of the error which Peirce identifies here. |
14780 | Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is foolish to study logic unless one is persuaded that one's own reasonings are more or less bad. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Criterion of Validity in Reasoning [1903], II) |
19400 | Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: From the conflict of all the possibles demanding existence, this at once follows, that there exists that series of things by which as many of them as possible exist. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.91) | |
A reaction: I'm in tune with a lot of Leibniz, but my head swims with this one. He seems to be a Lewisian about possible worlds - that they are concrete existing entities (with appetites!). Could Lewis include Leibniz's idea in his system? |
19401 | God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The sufficient reason for God's choice can be found only in the fitness (convenance) or in the degree of perfection that the several worlds possess. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92) | |
A reaction: The 'fitness' of a world and its 'perfection' seem very different things. A piece of a jigsaw can have wonderful fitness, without perfection. Occasionally you get that sinking feeling with metaphysicians that they just make it up. |
14778 | Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Facts are hard things which do not consist in my thinking so and so, but stand unmoved by whatever you or I or any man or generations of men may opine about them. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Criterion of Validity in Reasoning [1903], I) | |
A reaction: This is my view of facts, with which I am perfectly happy, for all the difficulties involved in individuating facts, and in disentangling them from our own modes of thought and expression. Let us try to establish the facts. |
19402 | The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The actual universe is the collection of the possibles which forms the richest composite. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92) | |
A reaction: 'Richest' for Leibniz means a maximum combination of existence, order and variety. It's rather like picking the best starting team from a squad of footballers. |
2713 | Are sense-data independent, with identity, substance and location? [Tye] |
Full Idea: Can sense-data exist unsensed? Can two persons experience numerically identical sense-data? Do sense-data have surfaces which are not sensed? What are sense-data made of? Are they located? | |
From: Michael Tye (Adverbial Theory [1995], p.7) |