Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Aristotle and Descartes on Matter', 'fragments/reports' and 'On 'Insolubilia' and their solution'

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5 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets

21563	The 'no classes' theory says the propositions just refer to the members [Russell]
	Full Idea: The contention of the 'no classes' theory is that all significant propositions concerning classes can be regarded as propositions about all or some of their members.
	From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.200)
	A reaction: Apparently this theory has not found favour with later generations of theorists. I see it in terms of Russell trying to get ontology down to the minimum, in the spirit of Goodman and Quine.

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / d. Richard's paradox

21565	Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell]
	Full Idea: In Richard's puzzle, we use the notion of 'definition', and this, oddly enough, is not definable, and is indeed not a definite notion at all.
	From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.209)
	A reaction: The background for this claim is his type theory, which renders certain forms of circular reference meaningless.

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox

21564	Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell]
	Full Idea: The 'vicious-circle principle' says 'whatever involves an apparent variable must not be among the possible values of that variable', or (less exactly) 'whatever involves ALL must not be one of ALL which it involves.
	From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.204)
	A reaction: He offers this as a parallel to his 'no classes' principle. That referred to classes, but this refers to propositions, and specifically the Liar Paradox (which he calls the 'Epimenedes').

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object

6019	If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus]
	Full Idea: If, for the sake of argument, someone were to mould a horse, squash it, then make a dog, it would be reasonable for us on seeing this to say that this previously did not exist but now does exist.
	From: Mnesarchus (fragments/reports [c.120 BCE]), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 179.11
	A reaction: Locke would say it is new, because the substance is the same, but a new life now exists. A sword could cease to exist and become a new ploughshare, I would think. Apply this to the Ship of Theseus. Is form more important than substance?

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter

19399	Prime matter is nothing when it is at rest [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Primary matter is nothing if considered at rest.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Aristotle and Descartes on Matter [1671], p.90)
	A reaction: This goes with Leibniz's Idea 13393, that activity is the hallmark of existence. No one seems to have been able to make good sense of prime matter, and it plays little role in Aristotle's writings.