Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Résumé of Metaphysics', 'On Platonism in Mathematics' and '17: Epistle to Titus'

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7 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays]
     Full Idea: Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics.
     From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934])
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
One of their own prophets said that Cretans are always liars [Anon (Titus)]
     Full Idea: One of themselves, even a prophet of their own, said, the Cretians are always liars, evil beasts, slow bellies. This witness is true.
     From: Anon (Titus) (17: Epistle to Titus [c.115], I.12)
     A reaction: The classic statement of the paradox, the word 'always' being the source of the problem.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays]
     Full Idea: A restricted Platonism does not claim to be more than, so to speak, an ideal projection of a domain of thought.
     From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.261)
     A reaction: I have always found Platonism to be congenial when it talks of 'ideals', and ridiculous when it talks of a special form of 'existence'. Ideals only 'exist' because we idealise things. I may declare myself, after all, to be a Restricted Platonist.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays]
     Full Idea: Mathematical abstraction does not have a lesser degree than logical abstraction, but rather another direction.
     From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.268)
     A reaction: His point is that the logicists seem to think that if you increasingly abstract from mathematics, you end up with pure logic.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: An intelligent being's pleasure is simply the perception of beauty, order and perfection.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §18)
     A reaction: Leibniz seems to have inherited this from the Greeks, especially Pythagoras and Plato. Buried in Leibniz's remark I see the Christian fear of physical pleasure. He should have got out more. Must an intelligent being always be intelligent?
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Perfection is simply quantity of reality.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §11)
     A reaction: An interesting claim, but totally beyond my personal comprehension. I presume he inherited 'quantity of reality' from Plato, e.g. as you move up the Line from shadows to Forms you increase the degree of reality. I see 'real' as all-or-nothing.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Evils themselves serve a greater good, and the fact that pains are found in minds is necessary if they are to reach greater pleasures.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §23)
     A reaction: How much pain is needed to qualify for the 'greater pleasures'? Some people receive an awful lot. I am not sure exactly how an evil can 'serve' a greater good. Is he recommending evil?