7 ideas
22626 | Process philosophy insists that processes are not inferior in being to substances [Rescher] |
Full Idea: Process philosophy diametrically opposes the view that denies processes or downgrades them in the order of being or of understanding by subordinating them to substantial things. | |
From: Nicholas Rescher (Process Metaphysics [1996]), quoted by R.D. Ingthorsson - A Powerful Particulars View of Causation 7 | |
A reaction: [No page cited - nr start?] Ingthorsson quotes this in order to challenge it, and says that substances are also processes, because change is essential to them. |
18528 | The single imagined 'interval' between things only exists in the intellect [Auriol] |
Full Idea: It appears that a single thing, which must be imagined as some sort of interval [intervallum] existing between two things, cannot exist in extramental reality, but only in the intellect. | |
From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], I fols318 v a-b), quoted by John Heil - The Universe as We Find It 7 | |
A reaction: This is the standard medieval denial of the existence of real relations. It contrasts with post-Russell ontology, which seems to admit relations as entities. Heil and Auriol and right. |
5049 | Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: An intelligent being's pleasure is simply the perception of beauty, order and perfection. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §18) | |
A reaction: Leibniz seems to have inherited this from the Greeks, especially Pythagoras and Plato. Buried in Leibniz's remark I see the Christian fear of physical pleasure. He should have got out more. Must an intelligent being always be intelligent? |
16589 | Prime matter lacks essence, but is only potentially and indeterminately a physical thing [Auriol] |
Full Idea: Prime matter has no essence, nor a nature that is determinate, distinct, and actual. Instead, it is pure potential, and determinable, so that it is indeterminately and indistinctly a material thing. | |
From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], II.12.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1 | |
A reaction: Pasnau thinks Auriol has the best shot at explaining the vague idea of 'prime matter', with the thought that it exists, but indeterminateness is what gives it a lesser mode of existence. It strikes me as best to treat 'exist' as univocal. |
5048 | Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Perfection is simply quantity of reality. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §11) | |
A reaction: An interesting claim, but totally beyond my personal comprehension. I presume he inherited 'quantity of reality' from Plato, e.g. as you move up the Line from shadows to Forms you increase the degree of reality. I see 'real' as all-or-nothing. |
16651 | God can do anything non-contradictory, as making straightness with no line, or lightness with no parts [Auriol] |
Full Idea: If someone says 'God could make straightness without a line, and roughness and lightness in weight without parts', …then show me the reason why God can do whatever does not imply a contradiction, yet cannot do these things. | |
From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], IV.12.2.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 11.4 | |
A reaction: How engagingly bonkers. The key idea preceding this is that God can do all sorts of things that are beyond our understanding. He is then obliged to offer some examples. |
5050 | Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Evils themselves serve a greater good, and the fact that pains are found in minds is necessary if they are to reach greater pleasures. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §23) | |
A reaction: How much pain is needed to qualify for the 'greater pleasures'? Some people receive an awful lot. I am not sure exactly how an evil can 'serve' a greater good. Is he recommending evil? |