Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Aristotle and Descartes on Matter', 'Ways Worlds Could Be' and 'Truth, Correspondence, Explanation and Knowledge'

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4 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18487 We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge]
     Full Idea: The generalisation 'What makes a (any) sentence true?' is not a request for definitions of 'true' (the concept), but rather requests for (partial) explanations of why certain particular sentences are true.
     From: Ian McFetridge (Truth, Correspondence, Explanation and Knowledge [1977], II)
     A reaction: McFetridge is responding to the shortcomings of Tarski's account of truth. The mystery seems to be why some of our representations of the world are 'successful', and others are not.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
18488 We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge]
     Full Idea: If one were asked 'What makes salt soluble in water?', the most natural answer would be something of the style 'The fact that it has such-and-such structure'.
     From: Ian McFetridge (Truth, Correspondence, Explanation and Knowledge [1977], II)
     A reaction: Personally I would want to talk about its 'powers' (dispositional properties), rather than its 'structure' (categorical properties). This defends facts, but you could easily paraphrase 'fact' out of this reply (as McFetridge realised).
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15432 Structural universals might serve as possible worlds [Forrest, by Lewis]
     Full Idea: Forrest proposed that structural universals should serve as ersatz possible worlds.
     From: report of Peter Forrest (Ways Worlds Could Be [1986]) by David Lewis - Against Structural Universals 'Intro'
     A reaction: I prefer powers to property universals. Perhaps a possible world is a maximal set of co-existing dispositions?
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
19399 Prime matter is nothing when it is at rest [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Primary matter is nothing if considered at rest.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Aristotle and Descartes on Matter [1671], p.90)
     A reaction: This goes with Leibniz's Idea 13393, that activity is the hallmark of existence. No one seems to have been able to make good sense of prime matter, and it plays little role in Aristotle's writings.