Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'True Method in Philosophy and Theology', 'A Priori Knowledge Revisited' and 'Protrepticus (frags)'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
17949 Inquiry is the cause of philosophy [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Inquiry is the cause of philosophy.
     From: Aristotle (Protrepticus (frags) [c.334 BCE]), quoted by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.120
     A reaction: The earlier part of the quote says philosophical thinking is inescapable (even if philosophy is impossible). I suppose we would call it 'curiosity'.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
12430 Classical logic is our preconditions for assessing empirical evidence [Kitcher]
     Full Idea: In my terminology, classical logic (or at least, its most central tenets) consists of propositional preconditions for our assessing empirical evidence in the way we do.
     From: Philip Kitcher (A Priori Knowledge Revisited [2000], §VII)
     A reaction: I like an even stronger version of this - that classical logic arises out of our experiences of things, and so we are just assessing empirical evidence in terms of other (generalised) empirical evidence. Logic results from induction. Very unfashionable.
12431 I believe classical logic because I was taught it and use it, but it could be undermined [Kitcher]
     Full Idea: I believe the laws of classical logic, in part because I was taught them, and in part because I think I see how those laws are used in assessing evidence. But my belief could easily be undermined by experience.
     From: Philip Kitcher (A Priori Knowledge Revisited [2000], §VII)
     A reaction: Quine has one genuine follower! The trouble is his first sentence would fit witch-doctoring just as well. Kitcher went to Cambridge; I hope he doesn't just believe things because he was taught them, or because he 'sees how they are used'!
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
19393 What is not active is nothing [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: We can now show from the inner truths of metaphysics that what is not active is nothing.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (True Method in Philosophy and Theology [1686], p.64)
     A reaction: This is Leibniz's rebellion against the Cartesian idea that all that matters for natural existence is spatial extension. I agree (tentatively) with Leibniz's vision of nature here. Modern physics reveals a seething turmoil beneath the placid exterior.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
12428 Many necessities are inexpressible, and unknowable a priori [Kitcher]
     Full Idea: There are plenty of necessary truths that we are unable to express, let alone know a priori.
     From: Philip Kitcher (A Priori Knowledge Revisited [2000], §II)
     A reaction: This certainly seems to put paid to any simplistic idea that the a priori and the necessary are totally coextensive. We might, I suppose, claim that all necessities are a priori for the Archangel Gabriel (or even a very bright cherub). Cf. Idea 12429.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
12429 Knowing our own existence is a priori, but not necessary [Kitcher]
     Full Idea: What is known a priori may not be necessary, if we know a priori that we ourselves exist and are actual.
     From: Philip Kitcher (A Priori Knowledge Revisited [2000], §II)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 12428, which challenges the inverse of this relationship. This one looks equally convincing, and Kripke adds other examples of contingent a priori truths, such as those referring to the metre rule in Paris.