12 ideas
| 22462 | We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it [Foot] |
| Full Idea: There belongs to truthfulness not only the avoidance of lying but also that other kind of attachment to truth which has to do with its preservation and pursuit. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.74) | |
| A reaction: This is truth as a value, rather than as a mere phenomenon of accurate thought and speech. The importance of 'preserving' the truth is the less common part of this idea. |
| 12699 | A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Without soul or form of some kind, a body would have no being, because no part of it can be designated which does not in turn consist of more parts. Thus nothing could be designated in a body which could be called 'this thing', or a unity. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1988), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1 | |
| A reaction: The locution 'soul or form' is disconcerting, and you have to spend some time with Leibniz to get the hang of it. The 'soul' is not intelligent, and is more like a source of action and response. |
| 12700 | Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Substantial form, or soul, is the principle of unity and duration, matter is that of multiplicity and change | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1398-9), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2 | |
| A reaction: Leibniz was a fan of the unfashionable Aristotle, and tried to put a spin on his views consonant with contemporary Hobbesian mechanistic views. Oddly, he likes the idea that 'form' is indestructable, which I don't understand. |
| 12736 | If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| Full Idea: Insofar as we have some insight into how God chooses, we can know a priori the laws of nature that God chooses for this best of all possible worlds. In this way, it is possible to have genuine a priori knowledge of contingent truths. | |
| From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1998-9) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6 | |
| A reaction: I think it would be doubtful whether our knowledge of God's choosings would count as a priori. How do we discover them? Ah! We derive God from the ontological argument, and his choosings from the divine perfection implied thereby. |
| 12698 | Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: I believe that there is in every body a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.2010), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1 | |
| A reaction: Note that he never says that there is any intelligence present. This eventually becomes his monadology, but Leibniz is the most obvious post-Greek philosopher to flirt with panpsychism. |
| 8119 | Art aims only at beauty, of form, of idea, and (above all) of expression [Winckelmann, by Tolstoy] |
| Full Idea: According to Winckelmann, the law and aim of all art is beauty, independent of goodness. The three kinds of beauty are of form, of idea, and of expression (the highest aim, attainable only when the other two are present). | |
| From: report of Johann Winckelmann (History of Ancient Art [1764]) by Leo Tolstoy - What is Art? Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: This sounds very like 'art for art's sake', but a hundred years earlier. This is quite a good distinction, and I particularly like the 'beauty of idea', which is often overlooked. |
| 22460 | Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad? [Foot] |
| Full Idea: We should ask why we think that it makes sense to talk about morally good and bad states of affairs. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.68) | |
| A reaction: This is the key question in her attack on consequentialism. There is nothing 'morally' good about my football team winning a great victory. |
| 22458 | Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness [Foot] |
| Full Idea: For consequentialists there will be nothing that it will not be right to do to a perfectly innocent individual, if that is the only way of preventing another agent from doing more things of the same kind. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.61) | |
| A reaction: This is her generalised version that Williams dramatised as Jim and the Indians. Roughly, if you achieve a good outcome, it matters little how it is achieved. Foot sees consequentialism as the main problem with utilitarianism. |
| 22461 | Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions [Foot] |
| Full Idea: It is not that maximum welfare or 'the best outcome' stands outside morality as it foundation and arbiter, but rather that it appears within morality as the end of one of the virtues. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.73) | |
| A reaction: She cites justice and benevolence as aiming at different (and even conflicting) outcomes. I'm not sure about her distinction between 'outside' and 'within' morality. I suppose a virtuously created end is a moral end, unlike mere good states of affairs. |
| 22464 | The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon [Foot] |
| Full Idea: The idea of the goodness of total states of affairs played no part in Aristotle's moral philosophy, and in modern times plays not part either in Rawls's account of justice or in the theories of more thoroughgoing contractualists such as Scanlon. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.76) | |
| A reaction: We can add Kant to that. But if the supremely good state of affairs were permanently achieved, would that make morality irrelevant? A community of the exceptionally virtuous would not need the veil of ignorance, or contracts. |
| 22463 | Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community [Foot] |
| Full Idea: Morality is thought of as a kind of tacit legislation by the community. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.75) | |
| A reaction: Foot presents this as a utilitarian doctrine, because the tacit legislation is felt to produce the best outcomes. This is Nietzsche's good and evil, beyond which he wished to go (presumably following other values). |
| 22459 | For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly [Foot] |
| Full Idea: It would be irrational to obey even the most useful rule if in a particular instance we clearly see that such obedience will not have the best results. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.62) | |
| A reaction: This is the simple reason why attempts at rule utilitarianism always lead back to act utilitarianism. Another way of putting it is that a good rule can only be assessed by the outcomes of individual acts that follow it. |