10 ideas
| 19336 | Wisdom involves the desire to achieve perfection [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The wiser one is, the more one is determined to do that which is most perfect. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.151) | |
| A reaction: Debatable. 'Perfectionism' is a well-known vice in many areas of life. Life is short, and the demands on us are many. Skilled shortcuts and compromises are one hallmark of genius, and presumably also of wisdom. |
| 10009 | Substitutional quantification is just a variant of Tarski's account [Wallace, by Baldwin] |
| Full Idea: In a famous paper, Wallace argued that all interpretations of quantifiers (including the substitutional interpretation) are, in the end, variants of that proposed by Tarski (in 1936). | |
| From: report of Wallace, J (On the Frame of Reference [1970]) by Thomas Baldwin - Interpretations of Quantifiers | |
| A reaction: A significant-looking pointer. We must look elsewhere for Tarski's account, which will presumably subsume the objectual interpretation as well. The ontology of Tarski's account of truth is an enduring controversy. |
| 7696 | Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Leibniz, by Jacquette] |
| Full Idea: The historical honour of having first raised the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" belongs to Leibniz. | |
| From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697]) by Dale Jacquette - Ontology Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: I presume that people before Leibniz may well have had the thought, but not bothered to even articulate it, because there seemed nothing to say by way of answer, other than some reference to the inscrutable will of God. |
| 19341 | There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Since something rather than nothing exists, there is a certain urge for existence, or (so to speak) a straining toward existence in possible things or in possibility or essence itself; in a word, essence in and of itself strives for existence. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.150) | |
| A reaction: Thus 'essence precedes existence'. Not sure I understand this, but at least it places an active power at the root of everything (though Leibniz probably sees that as divine). The Big Bang triggered by a 'quantum fluctuation'? |
| 19428 | Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: From the very fact that something exists rather than nothing, we recognise that there is in possible things, that is, in the very possibility or essence, a certain exigent need of existence, and, so to speak, some claim to existence. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.347) | |
| A reaction: I love the fact that Leibniz tried to explain why there is something rather than nothing. Bede Rundle and Dale Jacquette are similar heroes. As Leibniz tells us, contradictions have no claim to existence, but non-contradictions do. |
| 5047 | The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Although the world is not metaphysically necessary, such that its contrary would imply a contradiction or logical absurdity, it is necessary physically, that is, determined in such a way that its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.139) | |
| A reaction: How does Leibniz know things like this? The distinction between 'metaphysical' necessity and 'natural' (what he calls 'physical') necessity is a key idea. But natural necessity is controversial. See 'Essentialism'. |
| 22137 | Observation can force rejection of some part of the initial set of claims [Duhem, by Boulter] |
| Full Idea: Logic and observation alone do not force a scientist to reject a scientific claim if experimental observations so not turn out as expected. The scientist must reject something of the initial set of claims, but that is a matter of choice. | |
| From: report of Pierre Duhem (The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory [1906]) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 2 | |
| A reaction: This is a key point against any simplified Popperian notion of falsification. Tiny observations can't kill huge well supported theories. |
| 18197 | Experiments only test groups of hypotheses, and can't show which one is wrong [Duhem] |
| Full Idea: The physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental test, but only a whole group of hypotheses; when the experiment is in disagreement with his predictions ...it does not designate which one should be changed. | |
| From: Pierre Duhem (The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory [1906], p.187), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics II.2 | |
| A reaction: This is the idea frequently invoked by Quine, in support of his holistic view of scientific knowledge (along with Neurath's Boat). |
| 19343 | We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: In practical affairs one always follows the decision rule in accordance with which one ought to seek the maximum or the minimum: namely, one prefers the maximum effect at the minimum cost, so to speak. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.150) | |
| A reaction: Animals probably do that too, and even water sort of obeys the rule when it runs downhill. |
| 19429 | The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: There is always in things a principle of determination which is based on consideration of maximum and minimum, such that the greatest effect is obtained with the least, so to speak, expenditure. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.347) | |
| A reaction: This is obvious in human endeavours. Leibniz applied it to physics, producing a principle that shortest paths are always employed. It has a different formal name in modern physics, I think. He says if you make an unrestricted triangle, it is equilateral. |