12 ideas
| 12251 | Substantial forms are not understood, and explain nothing [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Clearly no explanation can be given by these substantial forms for any natural action, since their defenders admit that they are occult and that they do not understand them themselves, ...so they explain nothing. | |
| From: René Descartes (Letters to Regius [1642], 1642.01), quoted by David S. Oderberg - Real Essentialism 267 n5 | |
| A reaction: [Oderberg gives refs for attack by Locke and Hume, p.66] Descartes' target is Aristotle's hylomorphism. The problem seems to be understanding what Aristotle meant, which is much more than mere 'shape'. More like 'controlling principle'. |
| 3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: The laws of associations were held to explicate the semantic coherence of intentional processes, which adjust the causal relations among Ideas to reflect corresponding relations among the things that they're ideas of. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.296) | |
| A reaction: With the support of evolution, and the backing of a correspondence theory of truth, plus more sophistication in the associations, this might work. |
| 3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: If there is to be an intentional science, there must be semantically evaluable things which have causal powers, and there must be laws relating beliefs and desires to one another, and to actions. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.293) | |
| A reaction: The semantics and causation sound fair enough, but the prospect of finding laws looks bleak (though, contrary to Davidson, I don't see why they can't exist). |
| 3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: It may be that intentional states are relations to mental symbols, and mental processes are implemented by causal relations among these symbols. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.296) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to see how something could have causal powers just by being a symbol. The theory needs something else to drive the causation. |
| 3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: These days most philosophers of mind suppose that most psychological properties are multiply realisable. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.298) | |
| A reaction: This is just speculation. The physical part may seem very different, but turn out to be identical in the ways that matter (like a knife made of two different metals). |
| 3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Folk psychology is primarily intentional explanation; it's the idea that people's behaviour can be explained by reference to the contents of their beliefs and desires. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.292) | |
| A reaction: Sounds good. To reject folk psychology (as reductivists tend to) is to reject the existence of significant intentional states which have causal properties |
| 3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: It is hard to see how the extrinsic properties of thoughts could supervene on their intrinsic properties. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.299) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't seem a big problem. Sometimes represented experiences establish the match; sometimes the match is not very good, or even wrong. |
| 5049 | Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: An intelligent being's pleasure is simply the perception of beauty, order and perfection. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §18) | |
| A reaction: Leibniz seems to have inherited this from the Greeks, especially Pythagoras and Plato. Buried in Leibniz's remark I see the Christian fear of physical pleasure. He should have got out more. Must an intelligent being always be intelligent? |
| 3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Laws are true generalisations that support counterfactuals and are confirmed by their instances. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.293) | |
| A reaction: This seems correct, but it doesn't disentangle laws as mental states from laws as features of nature |
| 5048 | Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Perfection is simply quantity of reality. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §11) | |
| A reaction: An interesting claim, but totally beyond my personal comprehension. I presume he inherited 'quantity of reality' from Plato, e.g. as you move up the Line from shadows to Forms you increase the degree of reality. I see 'real' as all-or-nothing. |
| 16772 | An angelic mind would not experience pain, even when connected to a human body [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Descartes points out that an angelic mind, even if causally connected to a human body, would not experience the same sort of bodily sensations; it would, instead, simply observe flesh being torn, like a piece of paper. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (Letters to Regius [1642], III:493) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.6 | |
| A reaction: Does that mean that the angel could not have the experience even if it wanted to have it. So they can't pick up a cup either? So they can't make themselves known to us, even if they are desperate to? So the Annunciation never happened? |
| 5050 | Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Evils themselves serve a greater good, and the fact that pains are found in minds is necessary if they are to reach greater pleasures. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §23) | |
| A reaction: How much pain is needed to qualify for the 'greater pleasures'? Some people receive an awful lot. I am not sure exactly how an evil can 'serve' a greater good. Is he recommending evil? |