Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reply to Foucher', 'A Theory of Conditionals' and 'Straw Dogs'

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10 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Human knowledge may not produce well-being; the examined life may not be worth living [Gray]
     Full Idea: Human knowledge is one thing, human well-being another. There is no predetermined harmony between the two. The examined life may not be worth living.
     From: John Gray (Straw Dogs [2002], 1.9)
     A reaction: John Gray has set himself up as the Eeyore of modern times, but this point may obviously be correct. Presumably Socrates meant that the examined life was better even if the result was less 'well-being'. Even Gray doesn't want a lobotomy.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
I strongly believe in the actual infinite, which indicates the perfections of its author [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I am so much for the actual infinite that instead of admitting that nature abhors it, as is commonly said, I hold that it affects nature everywhere in order to indicate the perfections of its author.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reply to Foucher [1693], p.99)
     A reaction: I would have thought that, for Leibniz, while infinities indicate the perfections of their author, that is not the reason why they exist. God wasn't, presumably, showing off. Leibniz does not think we can actually know these infinities.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Consider a possible world in which A is true and otherwise differs minimally from the actual world. 'If A, then B' is true (false) just in case B is true (false) in that possible world.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (A Theory of Conditionals [1968], p.34), quoted by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 4.1
     A reaction: This is the first proposal to give a possible worlds semantics for conditional statements. Edgington observes that worlds which are nearby for me may not be nearby for you.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: A possible world is the ontological analogue of a stock of hypothetical beliefs.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (A Theory of Conditionals [1968], p.34), quoted by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 4.1
     A reaction: Sounds neat and persuasive. What is the ontological analogue of a stock of hopes? Heaven!
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 9. Naturalised Epistemology
Knowledge does not need minds or nervous systems; it is found in all living things [Gray]
     Full Idea: Knowledge does not need minds, or even nervous systems. It is found in all living things.
     From: John Gray (Straw Dogs [2002], 2.10)
     A reaction: I consider it a misnomer to call such things 'knowledge', for which I have much higher standards. Gray is talking about 'information'. Knowledge needs reasons, and possibility of error, not just anticipatory behaviour.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
The will hardly ever does anything; most of our life just happens to us [Gray]
     Full Idea: We think our actions express our decisions, but in nearly all of our life, willing decides nothing. We cannot wake up or fall asleep, remember or forget our dreams, summon or banish our thoughts, by deciding to do so.
     From: John Gray (Straw Dogs [2002], 2.12)
     A reaction: Gray's point does not rule out occasional total control over mental life, but his point is important. The traditional picture is of a life controlled, so the will is seen as at the centre of a person, but it just isn't the case.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Nowadays we identify the free life with the good life [Gray]
     Full Idea: We do not value freedom more than people did in earlier times, but we have identified the good life with the chosen life.
     From: John Gray (Straw Dogs [2002], 3.13)
     A reaction: Interesting. This is Enlightenment liberalism gradually filtering down into common consciousness, especially via the hegemony of American culture. I sympathise the Gray; don't get me wrong, but I think freedom is overrated.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 4. Ecology
Over forty percent of the Earth's living tissue is human [Gray]
     Full Idea: Humans co-opt over forty per cent of the Earth's living tissue.
     From: John Gray (Straw Dogs [2002], 4.15)
     A reaction: If you add our domestic animals, I understand that the figure goes up to 95 per cent! I take this to be virtually the only significant ecological fact - population, population, population. Why are there so many cars? So many carbon footprints?
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Without Christianity we lose the idea that human history has a meaning [Gray]
     Full Idea: For Christians, it is because they occur in history that the lives of humans have a meaning that the lives of other animals do not. ..If we truly leave Christianity behind, we must give up the idea that human history has a meaning.
     From: John Gray (Straw Dogs [2002], 2.3)
     A reaction: Interesting. Compare the dispute between 'whig' and 'tory' historians, the former of whom believe that history is going somewhere.
What was our original sin, and how could Christ's suffering redeem it? [Gray]
     Full Idea: No one can say what was humankind's original sin, and no one understands how the suffering of Christ can redeem it.
     From: John Gray (Straw Dogs [2002], 4.1)
     A reaction: This nicely articulates a problem that has half bothered me, but I have never put into words. I always assumed Eve committed the sin, and Adam cops the blame for not controlling his woman. Dying for our sins has always puzzled me.