Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians', 'Philosophical Explanations' and 'Chapters on Scepticism'

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8 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs

3570	Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]
	Full Idea: Nozick suggests that knowledge is just belief which 'tracks the truth' (hence leaving out justification).
	From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch. 2

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts

2748	A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]
	Full Idea: Nozick says Gettier cases aren't knowledge because the proposition would be believed even if false. Proper justification must be more sensitive to the truth ("track the truth").
	From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981], 3.1) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 3.1
	A reaction: This is a bad idea. I see a genuine tree in my garden and believe it is there, so I know it. That I might have believed it if I was in virtually reality, or observing a mirror, won't alter that.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function

13195	To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: A house would be badly explained if we were to describe only the arrangement of its parts, but not its use.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.255)
	A reaction: This must partly fall under pragmatics (i.e. what the enquirer is interested in). But function plays a genuine role in artefacts, and also in evolved biological organs.

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds

1799	If we can't know minds, we can't know if Pyrrho was a sceptic [Theodosius, by Diog. Laertius]
	Full Idea: We can't say the school of Pyrrho is sceptical, because the motion of the mind in each individual is incomprehensible to others, so we don't know Pyrrho's disposition.
	From: report of Theodosius (Chapters on Scepticism [c.100 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.8

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving

13193	Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Active force should not be thought of as the simple and common potential [potentia] or receptivity to action of the schools. Rather, active force involves an effort [conatus] or striving [tendentia] toward action.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.252)
	A reaction: This is why Leibniz is lured into making his active forces more and more animistic, till they end up like proto-minds (though never, remember, conscious and willing minds).

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature

13194	God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: To say that, in creation, God gave bodies a law for acting means nothing, unless, at the same time, he gave them something by means of which it could happen that the law is followed.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.253)
	A reaction: This is the beginning of the modern rebellion against the medieval view of laws as imposed from outside on passive matter. Unfortunately for Leibniz, once you have postulated active internal powers, the external laws become redundant.

27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces

13196	All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: All qualities of bodies .....are in the end reduced [revoco] to forces.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.256)
	A reaction: The dots conceal a long qualification, but he is essentially standing by this simple remark. If you substitute the word 'powers' for 'forces', I think that is just about right.

13192	Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The dynamicon or power [potentia] in bodies is twofold, passive and active. Passive force [vis] constitutes matter or mass [massa], and active force constitutes entelechy or form.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.252)
	A reaction: This is explicitly equating the innate force understood in physics with Aristotelian form. The passive force is to explain the resistance of bodies. I like the equation of force with power. He says the entelechy is 'analogous' to a soul.