25 ideas
15163 | The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames] |
Full Idea: The chief philosophical interest in quantified modal logic lies with metaphysical necessity, essentialism, and the nontrivial modal de re. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1) |
15158 | Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames] |
Full Idea: The indefinite description in 'A man will meet you' is naturally treated as quantificational, but an occurrence in predicative position, in 'Jones is not a philosopher', doesn't have a natural quantificational counterpart. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.23) |
15157 | Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames] |
Full Idea: Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, rather than a singular term, is a real insight. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.22) | |
A reaction: 'Would the man who threw the stone come forward' seems like a different usage from 'would the man in the black hat come forward'. |
15156 | The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames] |
Full Idea: Since Frege and Russell were mainly interested in formalizing mathematics, the only quantifiers they needed were the universal and existential one. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.22) |
15162 | We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames] |
Full Idea: Our understanding of metaphysical necessity is intuitive - drawn from our ordinary thought and talk. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1) | |
A reaction: This, of course, is a good reason for analytic philosophers to dislike metaphysical necessity. |
15161 | There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames] |
Full Idea: The set of metaphysically necessary truths is larger than the set of logically necessary truths. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1) | |
A reaction: Likewise, the set of logically possible truths is much larger than the set of metaphysically possible truths. If a truth is logically necessary, it will clearly be metaphysically necessary. Er, unless it is necessitated by daft logic... |
15152 | To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames] |
Full Idea: The systematic study of meaning requires a framework for specifying the truth conditions of sentences on the basis of their syntactic structure, and the representational contents of their parts. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro) | |
A reaction: Soames presents this as common sense, on the first page of his book, and it is hard to disagree. Representation will shade off into studying the workings of the mind. Fodor seems a good person to start with. |
15153 | Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames] |
Full Idea: The truth conditions provided by Tarski's theories (based on references of subsentential constituents) are too weak to determine meanings, because they lacked context-sensitivity and various forms of intensionality. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro) | |
A reaction: Interesting. This suggests that stronger modern axiomatic theories of truth might give a sufficient basis for a truth conditions theory of meaning. Soames says possible worlds semantics was an attempt to improve things. |
15154 | We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames] |
Full Idea: Instead of explaining the representationality of sentences and cognitive states in terms of propositions, we must explain the representationality of propositions in terms of the representationality of the relevant cognitive states. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro) | |
A reaction: Music to my ears. I am bewildered by this Russellian notion of a 'proposition' as some abstract entity floating around in the world waiting to be expressed. The vaguer word 'facts' (and false facts?) will cover that. It's Frege's fault. |
5049 | Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: An intelligent being's pleasure is simply the perception of beauty, order and perfection. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §18) | |
A reaction: Leibniz seems to have inherited this from the Greeks, especially Pythagoras and Plato. Buried in Leibniz's remark I see the Christian fear of physical pleasure. He should have got out more. Must an intelligent being always be intelligent? |
5048 | Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Perfection is simply quantity of reality. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §11) | |
A reaction: An interesting claim, but totally beyond my personal comprehension. I presume he inherited 'quantity of reality' from Plato, e.g. as you move up the Line from shadows to Forms you increase the degree of reality. I see 'real' as all-or-nothing. |
20712 | God is 'eternal' either by being non-temporal, or by enduring forever [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: Saying 'God is eternal' means either that God is non-temporal or timeless, or that God has no beginning and no end. The first ('classical') view is found in Anselm, Augustine, Boethius, Aquinas, Calvin and Descartes. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 8 'Meaning') | |
A reaction: A God who is outside of time but performs actions is a bit of a puzzle. It seems that Augustine started the idea of a timeless God. |
20701 | Can God be good, if he has not maximised goodness? [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: We may wonder whether God can be good since he has not produced more moral goodness than he has. We may wonder whether God is guilty by neglect. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 3 'Freedom') | |
A reaction: The orthodox response is that we cannot possibly know what the maximum of moral goodness would look like, so we can't make this judgement. Atheists say that God fails by human standards, which are not particularly high. |
20702 | The goodness of God may be a higher form than the goodness of moral agents [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: If we can know that God exists and if God's goodness is not moral goodness, then moral goodness is not the highest form of goodness we know. There is the goodness of God to be reckoned with. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 3 'Goodness') | |
A reaction: This idea is to counter the charge that God fails to meet human standards for an ideal moral agent. But it sounds hand-wavy, since we presumably cannot comprehend the sort of goodness that is postulated here. |
20703 | How could God have obligations? What law could possibly impose them? [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: We have good reason for resisting the suggestion that God has any duties or obligations. …What can oblige God in relation to his creatures? Could there be a law saying God has such obligations? Where does such a law come from? | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 3 'Goodness') | |
A reaction: Plato can answer this question. Greek gods are not so supreme that nothing could put them under an obligation, but 'God' has to be supreme in every respect. |
20694 | 'Natural theology' aims to prove God to anyone (not just believers) by reason or argument [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: 'Natural theology' is the attempt to show that belief in God's existence can be defended with reference to reason or argument which ought to be acceptable to anyone, not simply to those who believe in God's existence. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 1 'Other') | |
A reaction: I assume by 'reason or argument' he primarily means evidence (plus the ontological argument). He cites Karl Barth as objecting to the assumption of natural theology (preferring revelation). Presumably Kierkegaard offers a rival view too. |
20706 | A distinct cause of the universe can't be material (which would be part of the universe) [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: If the universe was caused to come into being, it presumably could not have been caused to do so by anything material. For a material object would be part of the universe, and we are now asking for a cause distinct from the universe. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 5 'God') | |
A reaction: We're out of our depth here. We only have two modes of existence to offer, material and spiritual, and 'spiritual' means little more than non-material. |
20707 | The universe exhibits design either in its sense of purpose, or in its regularity [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: The design argument offers two lines: the first states that the universe displays design in the sense of purpose; the second that it displays design in the sense of regularity. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 6 'Versions') | |
A reaction: I would have thought that you would infer the purpose from the regularity. How could you see purpose in a totally chaotic universe? |
20708 | If God is an orderly being, he cannot be the explanation of order [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: If God is an instance of something orderly, how can he serve to account for the order of orderly things? | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 6 'b Has') | |
A reaction: You can at least explain the tidiness of a house by the tidiness of its owner, but obviously that won't explain the phenomenon of tidiness. |
20710 | Maybe an abnormal state of mind is needed to experience God? [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: Might it not be possible that experience of God requires an unusual state or psychological abnormality, just as an aerial view of Paris requires that one be in the unusual state of being abnormally elevated? | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 7 'Are the') | |
A reaction: That would make sense if it were analogous to great mathematical or musical ability, but it sounds more like ouija boards in darkened rooms. Talent has a wonderful output, but people in mystical states don't return with proofs. |
20711 | A believer can experience the world as infused with God [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: Maybe someone who believes in God can be regarded as experiencing everything as something behind which God lies. Believers see the world as a world in which God is present. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 7 'Experiencing') | |
A reaction: [Attributed to John Hick] This would count as supporting evidence for God, perhaps, if seeing reality as infused with God produces a consistent and plausible picture. But seeing reality as infused with other things might pass the same test. |
20709 | The experiences of God are inconsistent, not universal, and untestable [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: A proclaimed experience of God must be rejected because a) there is no agreed test that it is such an experience, b) some people experience God's absence, and c) there is no uniformity of testimony about the experience. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 7 'Objections') | |
A reaction: [compressed] I'm not sure that absence of an experience is experience of an absence. Compare it with experiencing the greatness of Beethoven's Ninth. |
20697 | One does not need a full understanding of God in order to speak of God [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: In order to speak meaningfully about God, it is not necessary that one should understand exactly the import of one's statements about him. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 2 'Sayng') | |
A reaction: Perfectly reasonable. To insist that all discussion of a thing requires exact understanding of the thing is ridiculous. Equally, though, to discuss God while denying all understanding of God is just as ridiculous. |
20699 | Paradise would not contain some virtues, such as courage [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: There are virtues (such as courage) that would not be present in a paradise. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 3 'Evil') | |
A reaction: Part of a suggestion that morality would be entirely inapplicable in paradise, and so we need dangers etc in the world. |
5050 | Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Evils themselves serve a greater good, and the fact that pains are found in minds is necessary if they are to reach greater pleasures. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §23) | |
A reaction: How much pain is needed to qualify for the 'greater pleasures'? Some people receive an awful lot. I am not sure exactly how an evil can 'serve' a greater good. Is he recommending evil? |