11 ideas
22626 | Process philosophy insists that processes are not inferior in being to substances [Rescher] |
Full Idea: Process philosophy diametrically opposes the view that denies processes or downgrades them in the order of being or of understanding by subordinating them to substantial things. | |
From: Nicholas Rescher (Process Metaphysics [1996]), quoted by R.D. Ingthorsson - A Powerful Particulars View of Causation 7 | |
A reaction: [No page cited - nr start?] Ingthorsson quotes this in order to challenge it, and says that substances are also processes, because change is essential to them. |
5044 | Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A multiplicity can only be made up of true unities, ..so I had recourse to the idea of a real and animated point, or an atom of substance which must embrace some element of form or of activity in order to make a complete being. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New System and Explanation of New System [1696], p.116) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a combination of logical atomism and panpsychism. It has a certain charm, but looks like another example of these rationalist speculators overreaching themselves. |
18076 | Most theories are continually falsified [Kuhn, by Kitcher] |
Full Idea: Kuhn contends that almost all theories are falsified at almost all times. | |
From: report of Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]) by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 07.1 | |
A reaction: This is obviously meant to demolish Karl Popper. |
22191 | Kuhn's scientists don't aim to falsifying their paradigm, because that is what they rely on [Kuhn, by Gorham] |
Full Idea: In Kuhn's view scientists are decidedly not interested in falsifying their paradigm, because without a paradigm there is no systematic inquiry at all. | |
From: report of Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]) by Geoffrey Gorham - Philosophy of Science 3 | |
A reaction: This seems to be one of the stronger aspects of Kuhn's account. You'd be leaving the big house, to go out on the road with a tent. |
22183 | Switching scientific paradigms is a conversion experience [Kuhn] |
Full Idea: The transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience which cannot be forced. | |
From: Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]), quoted by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 5 | |
A reaction: This is the controversial part of Kuhn, which says that the most important decisions are not really rational. Anyone who thought the interpretation of a bunch of evidence is logical needed their head examined. But it IS rational. |
6162 | Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions [Rowlands on Kuhn] |
Full Idea: Kuhn and Feyerabend adopt a description theory of reference; the term 'electron' refers to whatever satisfies the descriptions associated with electrons, and since these descriptions vary between theories, so too must the reference. | |
From: comment on Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This is a key idea in modern philosophy, showing why all of reality and science were at stake when Kripke and others introduced a causal theory of reference. All the current debates about externalism and essentialism grow from this problem. |
22184 | Incommensurability assumes concepts get their meaning from within the theory [Kuhn, by Okasha] |
Full Idea: The doctrine of incommensurability stems from Kuhn's belief that scientific concepts derive their meaning from the theory in which they play a role. | |
From: report of Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]) by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 5 | |
A reaction: Quine was the source of this. Kripke's direct reference theory was meant to be the answer. |
7619 | Galileo's notions can't be 'incommensurable' if we can fully describe them [Putnam on Kuhn] |
Full Idea: To tell us that Galileo had 'incommensurable' notions and then go on to describe them at length is totally incoherent. | |
From: comment on Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]) by Hilary Putnam - Reason, Truth and History Ch.5 | |
A reaction: How refreshingly sensible. Incommensurability is the sort of nonsense you slide into if you take an instrumental view of science. But scientists are continually aim to pin down what is actually there. Translation between theories is very difficult! |
5045 | No machine or mere organised matter could have a unified self [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: By means of the soul or form, there is a true unity which is called the 'I' in us; a thing which could not occur in artificial machines, nor in the simple mass of matter, however organised it may be. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New System and Explanation of New System [1696], p.120) | |
A reaction: I think the unity of consciousness and the unified Self are different phenomena. A wonderful remark about artificial intelligence for 1696! Note the idea of functionalism contained in 'organised'. Personally I see the brain as a 'mass of matter'. |
5046 | The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I do not admit that the soul does not know bodies, although this knowledge arises without their influencing one another. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New System and Explanation of New System [1696], Reply 11) | |
A reaction: He couldn't very well admit this without moving into pure idealism. Presumably it is like "I know her - she'll be in Harrods this morning". I wonder if Satan could steal my body, but my mind continue to believe it was still there? |
5043 | To regard animals as mere machines may be possible, but seems improbable [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that the opinion of those who transform or degrade the lower animals into mere machines, although it seems possible, is improbable, and even against the order of things. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New System and Explanation of New System [1696], p.116) | |
A reaction: His target is Descartes. 'Against the order of things' seems to beg the question. What IS the order of things? Only a thorough-going dualist would worry about this question, and that isn't me. |