Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Aristotle and Descartes on Matter', 'Physiologia' and 'Introducing Persons'

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5 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
16674 The quantity is just the matter, in that it has extended parts and is diffuse [Charleton]
     Full Idea: The extension or quantity of a thing is merely modus materiae, or (rather) the matter itself composing that thing; insomuch as it consists not in a point, but has parts posited without parts, in respect whereof it is diffuse.
     From: Walter Charleton (Physiologia [1654], III.10.1.4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.2
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
1394 Can the mental elements of a 'bundle' exist on their own? [Carruthers]
     Full Idea: If the mind is merely a bundle of states and events, it must be logically possible for the various elements of the bundle to exist on their own.
     From: Peter Carruthers (Introducing Persons [1986], 2.iii (A))
     A reaction: Depends how literally you take the bundle metaphor, and how much you are worried about 'logical' possibility (which only seems to mean imaginable). The answers to these questions do not have to be all-or-nothing.
1395 Why would a thought be a member of one bundle rather than another? [Carruthers]
     Full Idea: What makes it true that a particular thought or experience is a member of one bundle rather than another?
     From: Peter Carruthers (Introducing Persons [1986], 2.iii (B))
     A reaction: I'm not sure if you can answer this nice question without mentioning values. The mental events in are in my bundle because they matter to me (because they are related to my body, for which I am responsible). Compare picking my possessions out of a pile.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
1396 We identify persons before identifying conscious states [Carruthers]
     Full Idea: We can have no conception of the particularity of conscious states prior to, and independently of, a conception of a particularity of persons.
     From: Peter Carruthers (Introducing Persons [1986], 2.iii (C))
     A reaction: agrees with Butler
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
19399 Prime matter is nothing when it is at rest [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Primary matter is nothing if considered at rest.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Aristotle and Descartes on Matter [1671], p.90)
     A reaction: This goes with Leibniz's Idea 13393, that activity is the hallmark of existence. No one seems to have been able to make good sense of prime matter, and it plays little role in Aristotle's writings.