Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians', 'Russell's Ontological Development' and 'The Passions of the Soul'

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15 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
21699 Russell offered a paraphrase of definite description, to avoid the commitment to objects [Quine]
     Full Idea: Russell's theory involved defining a term not by presenting a direct equivalent of it, but by 'paraphrasis', providing equivalents of the sentences. In this way, reference to fictitious objects can be simulated without our being committed to the objects.
     From: Willard Quine (Russell's Ontological Development [1966], p.75)
     A reaction: I hadn't quite grasped that the modern strategy of paraphrase tracks back to Russell - though it now looks obvious, thanks to Quine. Paraphrase is a beautiful way of sidestepping ontological problems. See Frege on the moons of Jupiter.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
13195 To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: A house would be badly explained if we were to describe only the arrangement of its parts, but not its use.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.255)
     A reaction: This must partly fall under pragmatics (i.e. what the enquirer is interested in). But function plays a genuine role in artefacts, and also in evolved biological organs.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
13193 Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Active force should not be thought of as the simple and common potential [potentia] or receptivity to action of the schools. Rather, active force involves an effort [conatus] or striving [tendentia] toward action.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.252)
     A reaction: This is why Leibniz is lured into making his active forces more and more animistic, till they end up like proto-minds (though never, remember, conscious and willing minds).
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
3654 The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [Descartes, by PG]
     Full Idea: The soul is united with the body in just one place, a gland (the pineal) in the centre of the brain. It is placed so that its slightest movement will affect the passions, and it plays the essential role of uniting the two symmetrical sides of the body.
     From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], §31) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: See Idea 4862 for Spinoza's nice response to Descartes' proposal. If Descartes had followed brain research for the last four hundred years, at what point would he have wavered? If every single part of the brain seems to 'interact', dualism looks unlikely.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
4015 For Descartes passions are God-given preservers of the mind-body union [Descartes, by Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: Descartes sees passions not as opinions, but as functional devices that the Creator has designed for us to help preserve the body-soul substantial union.
     From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649]) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §8
     A reaction: I wonder what Descartes would have made of the theory of evolution?
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
4313 Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Descartes, by Cottingham]
     Full Idea: Descartes says there are six primary passions (wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness); Spinoza says there are just three (joy, sadness and desire).
     From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649]) by John Cottingham - The Rationalists p.172
     A reaction: A dubious project. However, it is now agreed that there are a few (six?) basic universal facial expressions, to which these passions may correspond.
23989 There are six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness [Descartes, by Goldie]
     Full Idea: Descartes said there are six primitive passions, namely wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness. The others are either species of these, or composed of them.
     From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], 353) by Peter Goldie - The Emotions 4 'Evidence'
     A reaction: [not sure about ref] It's a nice touch to add 'wonder', which doesn't make it onto anyone else's list.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
21700 Taking sentences as the unit of meaning makes useful paraphrasing possible [Quine]
     Full Idea: The new freedom that Russell confers by paraphrasis (of definite descriptions) is our reward for recognising that the unit of communication is the sentence and not the word.
     From: Willard Quine (Russell's Ontological Development [1966], p.75)
     A reaction: Since many people hardly ever speak a properly formed sentence, I take propositions to be better candidates for this. However, I don't see how we can reject the compositional view (the meanings are assembled).
21701 Knowing a word is knowing the meanings of sentences which contain it [Quine]
     Full Idea: We can say that knowing words is knowing how to work out the meanings of sentences containing them. Dictionary definitions are mere clauses in a recursive definition of the meanings of sentences.
     From: Willard Quine (Russell's Ontological Development [1966], p.76)
     A reaction: Do you have to recursively define all the sentences that might contain the word, before you can fully know the meaning of the word? He seems to credit Russell with the holistic view of sentences (though I think that starts with Frege).
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
20037 Merely willing to walk leads to our walking [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Our merely willing to walk has the consequence that our legs move and we walk.
     From: René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], 18), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 1 'Volitionism'
     A reaction: Stout attributes this to Descartes' dualism, as if legs are separate from persons. Stout says the idea of a prior mental act is not usually now considered as part of an action, or even to exist at all. If the volition is intentional, there is a regress.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
16763 We don't die because the soul departs; the soul departs because the organs cease functioning [Descartes]
     Full Idea: We ought to hold, on the contrary, that the soul takes its leave when we die only because this heat ceases and the organs that bring about bodily movement decay.
     From: René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], I.5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
     A reaction: This sounds like a pretty major change in our concept of death, given that we all now agree with Descartes.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
4016 Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue [Descartes, by Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue.
     From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649]) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §8
     A reaction: Presumably strength of will can serve evil ends, so this is a bit confusing.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
13194 God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: To say that, in creation, God gave bodies a law for acting means nothing, unless, at the same time, he gave them something by means of which it could happen that the law is followed.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.253)
     A reaction: This is the beginning of the modern rebellion against the medieval view of laws as imposed from outside on passive matter. Unfortunately for Leibniz, once you have postulated active internal powers, the external laws become redundant.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
13196 All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: All qualities of bodies .....are in the end reduced [revoco] to forces.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.256)
     A reaction: The dots conceal a long qualification, but he is essentially standing by this simple remark. If you substitute the word 'powers' for 'forces', I think that is just about right.
13192 Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The dynamicon or power [potentia] in bodies is twofold, passive and active. Passive force [vis] constitutes matter or mass [massa], and active force constitutes entelechy or form.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.252)
     A reaction: This is explicitly equating the innate force understood in physics with Aristotelian form. The passive force is to explain the resistance of bodies. I like the equation of force with power. He says the entelechy is 'analogous' to a soul.