Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Exigency to Exist in Essences', 'Apology of Socrates' and 'Aristotle and the Metaphysics'

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8 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis]
     Full Idea: Aristotle praises the Pythagoreans for being the first to offer definitions.
     From: report of Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4
     A reaction: This sounds like a hugely important step in the development of Greek philosophy which is hardly ever mentioned.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis]
     Full Idea: It is crucial not to confuse 'true' with 'true of'. 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words.
     From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 1.4)
     A reaction: A beautifully simple distinction which had never occurred to me, and which (being a thoroughgoing realist) I really like.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis]
     Full Idea: We may be unfamiliar with the question 'What is being?' because there appear to be no contrastive questions of the form: how do beings differ from things that are not beings?
     From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 4.1)
     A reaction: We can, of course, contrast actual beings with possible beings, or imaginary beings, or even logically impossible beings, but in those cases 'being' strikes me as an entirely inappropriate word.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: From the conflict of all the possibles demanding existence, this at once follows, that there exists that series of things by which as many of them as possible exist.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.91)
     A reaction: I'm in tune with a lot of Leibniz, but my head swims with this one. He seems to be a Lewisian about possible worlds - that they are concrete existing entities (with appetites!). Could Lewis include Leibniz's idea in his system?
God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The sufficient reason for God's choice can be found only in the fitness (convenance) or in the degree of perfection that the several worlds possess.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92)
     A reaction: The 'fitness' of a world and its 'perfection' seem very different things. A piece of a jigsaw can have wonderful fitness, without perfection. Occasionally you get that sinking feeling with metaphysicians that they just make it up.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis]
     Full Idea: An essence is true in virtue of what the thing is in itself, but a necessary truth may be relational, as the consequence of the relation between two things and their essence. The necessary relation may be two-way, but the essential relation one-way.
     From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 2.3)
     A reaction: He is writing about Aristotle, but has in mind Kit Fine 1994 (qv). Politis cites Plato's answer to the Euthyphro Question as a good example. The necessity comes from the intrinsic nature of goodness/piety, not from the desire of the gods.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The actual universe is the collection of the possibles which forms the richest composite.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92)
     A reaction: 'Richest' for Leibniz means a maximum combination of existence, order and variety. It's rather like picking the best starting team from a squad of footballers.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Education is the greatest of human goods [Xenophon]
     Full Idea: Education is the greatest of human goods.
     From: Xenophon (Apology of Socrates [c.392 BCE], 22)
     A reaction: Of course, one might ask what education is for, and arrive at a greater good. If you ask what is the greatest good which a society can provide for you, or which you can give to your children, this seems to me a good answer.