8 ideas
11257 | The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aristotle praises the Pythagoreans for being the first to offer definitions. | |
From: report of Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4 | |
A reaction: This sounds like a hugely important step in the development of Greek philosophy which is hardly ever mentioned. |
11235 | 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis] |
Full Idea: It is crucial not to confuse 'true' with 'true of'. 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words. | |
From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 1.4) | |
A reaction: A beautifully simple distinction which had never occurred to me, and which (being a thoroughgoing realist) I really like. |
11277 | Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis] |
Full Idea: We may be unfamiliar with the question 'What is being?' because there appear to be no contrastive questions of the form: how do beings differ from things that are not beings? | |
From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 4.1) | |
A reaction: We can, of course, contrast actual beings with possible beings, or imaginary beings, or even logically impossible beings, but in those cases 'being' strikes me as an entirely inappropriate word. |
19400 | Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: From the conflict of all the possibles demanding existence, this at once follows, that there exists that series of things by which as many of them as possible exist. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.91) | |
A reaction: I'm in tune with a lot of Leibniz, but my head swims with this one. He seems to be a Lewisian about possible worlds - that they are concrete existing entities (with appetites!). Could Lewis include Leibniz's idea in his system? |
19401 | God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The sufficient reason for God's choice can be found only in the fitness (convenance) or in the degree of perfection that the several worlds possess. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92) | |
A reaction: The 'fitness' of a world and its 'perfection' seem very different things. A piece of a jigsaw can have wonderful fitness, without perfection. Occasionally you get that sinking feeling with metaphysicians that they just make it up. |
11248 | Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis] |
Full Idea: An essence is true in virtue of what the thing is in itself, but a necessary truth may be relational, as the consequence of the relation between two things and their essence. The necessary relation may be two-way, but the essential relation one-way. | |
From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 2.3) | |
A reaction: He is writing about Aristotle, but has in mind Kit Fine 1994 (qv). Politis cites Plato's answer to the Euthyphro Question as a good example. The necessity comes from the intrinsic nature of goodness/piety, not from the desire of the gods. |
19402 | The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The actual universe is the collection of the possibles which forms the richest composite. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92) | |
A reaction: 'Richest' for Leibniz means a maximum combination of existence, order and variety. It's rather like picking the best starting team from a squad of footballers. |
5833 | Education is the greatest of human goods [Xenophon] |
Full Idea: Education is the greatest of human goods. | |
From: Xenophon (Apology of Socrates [c.392 BCE], 22) | |
A reaction: Of course, one might ask what education is for, and arrive at a greater good. If you ask what is the greatest good which a society can provide for you, or which you can give to your children, this seems to me a good answer. |