19076
|
Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO]
|
|
Full Idea:
Coherence theories of truth differ on their accounts of the coherence relation, and on their accounts of the set (or sets) of propositions with which true propositions occur (the 'specified set').
|
|
From:
James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1)
|
|
A reaction:
Coherence is clearly more than consistency or mutual entailment, and I like to invoke explanation. The set has to be large, or the theory is absurd (as two absurdities can 'cohere'). So very large, or very very large, or maximally large?
|
19077
|
Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO]
|
|
Full Idea:
It is unsatisfactory for the coherence relation to be consistency, because two propositions could be consistent with a 'specified set', and yet be inconsistent with each other. That would imply they are both true, which is impossible.
|
|
From:
James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1)
|
|
A reaction:
I'm not convinced by this. You first accept P because it is consistent with the set; then Q turns up, which is consistent with everything in the set except P. So you have to choose between them, and might eject P. Your set was too small.
|
19078
|
Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO]
|
|
Full Idea:
One extreme for the specified set is the largest consistent set of propositions currently believed by actual people. A moderate position makes it the limit of people's enquiries. The other extreme is what would be believed by an omniscient being.
|
|
From:
James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1)
|
|
A reaction:
One not considered is the set of propositions believed by each individual person. Thoroughgoing relativists might well embrace that one. Peirce and Putnam liked the moderate one. I'm taken with the last one, since truth is an ideal, not a phenomenon.
|
12737
|
Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone [Leibniz]
|
|
Full Idea:
All the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by final causes, exactly as if there were no efficient causes; and all the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by efficient causes, as if there were no final causes.
|
|
From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae [1678], A6.4.1403), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
|
|
A reaction:
Somewhat speculative (a virtue!), but it is interesting to see him suggesting that there might be two complete and satisfactory explanations, which never touched one another. I can't see Aristotle agreeing with that.
|
19074
|
Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO]
|
|
Full Idea:
For the coherence theory of truth, the truth conditions of propositions consist in other propositions. The correspondence theory, in contrast, states that the truth conditions of propositions are ... objective features of the world.
|
|
From:
James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], Intro)
|
|
A reaction:
It is obviously rather important for your truth-conditions theory of meaning that you are clear about your theory of truth. A correspondence theory is evidently taken for granted, even in possible worlds versions.
|
19082
|
Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO]
|
|
Full Idea:
Coherence theorists can argue that the truth conditions of a proposition are those under which speakers tend to assert it, ...and that speakers can only make a practice of asserting a proposition under conditions they can recognise as justifying it.
|
|
From:
James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §2.2)
|
|
A reaction:
[compressed] This sounds rather verificationist, and hence wrong, since if you then asserted anything for which you didn't know the justification, that would remove its truth, and thus make it meaningless.
|
11214
|
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
|
|
Full Idea:
The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A.
|
|
From:
Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV)
|
|
A reaction:
[compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role).
|