59 ideas
23917 | Contrary statements can both be reasonable, if they are meant in two different ways [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Contrary things can be reasonably held …because the contrary positions will stand if what is said is true in one way, but not true in another. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1235b17) | |
A reaction: My strategy here is to clarify the unambiguous underlying propositions which are being expressed. There will then be either agreement, or flat contradiction. |
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Frege rejected the traditional categories as importing psychological and linguistic impurities into logic. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 1.2 | |
A reaction: Resisting such impurities is the main motivation for making logic entirely symbolic, but it doesn't follow that the traditional categories have to be dropped. |
22329 | Logic is highly general truths abstracted from reality [Russell, by Glock] |
Full Idea: In 1911 Russell held that the propositions of logic are supremely general truths about the most pervasive traits of reality, to which we have access by abstraction from non-logical propositions. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Philosophical Implications of Mathematical logic [1911]) by Hans-Johann Glock - What is Analytic Philosophy? 2.4 | |
A reaction: Glock says the rival views were Mill's inductions, psychologism, and Frege's platonism. Wittgenstein converted Russell to a fifth view, that logic is empty tautologies. I remain resolutely attached to Russell's abstraction view. |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
Full Idea: Just as functions are fundamentally different from objects, so also functions whose arguments are and must be functions are fundamentally different from functions whose arguments are objects. The latter are first-level, the former second-level, functions. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.38) | |
A reaction: In 1884 he called it 'second-order'. This is the standard distinction between first- and second-order logic. The first quantifies over objects, the second over intensional entities such as properties and propositions. |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
Full Idea: Functions of one argument are concepts; functions of two arguments are relations. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.39) | |
A reaction: Nowadays we would say 'two or more'. Another interesting move in the aim of analytic philosophy to reduce the puzzling features of the world to mathematical logic. There is, of course, rather more to some relations than being two-argument functions. |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
Full Idea: I am of the opinion that arithmetic is a further development of logic, which leads to the requirement that the symbolic language of arithmetic must be expanded into a logical symbolism. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.30) | |
A reaction: This may the the one key idea at the heart of modern analytic philosophy (even though logicism may be a total mistake!). Logic and arithmetical foundations become the master of ontology, instead of the servant. The jury is out on the whole enterprise. |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
Full Idea: Frege regarded the existence of horses as a property of the concept 'horse'. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by Fred Sommers - Intellectual Autobiography 'Realism' |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
Full Idea: Frege's theory of properties (which he calls 'concepts') yields too few properties, by identifying coextensive properties, and also too many, by letting every predicate express a property. | |
From: comment on Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §2 | |
A reaction: Seems right; one extension may have two properties (have heart/kidneys), two predicates might express the same property. 'Cutting nature at the joints' covers properties as well as objects. |
5869 | The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The thesis that there is a Form either of good or indeed of anything else is verbal and vacuous. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1217b20) | |
A reaction: This is clear evidence for suggesting that Aristotle is a nominalist. Elsewhere his essentialism suggests otherwise, but clearly on grumpy days he thought that universals were mere verbal conventions. |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
Full Idea: I regard a regular definition of 'object' as impossible, since it is too simple to admit of logical analysis. Briefly: an object is anything that is not a function, so that an expression for it does not contain any empty place. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.32) | |
A reaction: Here is the core of the programme for deriving our ontology from our logic and language, followed through by Russell and Quine. Once we extend objects beyond the physical, it becomes incredibly hard to individuate them. |
22505 | The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If it is necessary that, if a triangle contains two right angles, that a quadrilateral has four, it is clear that the cause of this is that a triangle has two. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1222b31) | |
A reaction: We would not normally use the word 'cause' for this, but 'necessitates' seems to fit, and I like the word 'determines' (because it can be both physical and abstract). An example of what I think of as an Aristotelian necessity maker. |
22513 | Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Knowing and understanding is of two kinds, one having and the other using knowledge. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1225b11) | |
A reaction: This corresponds to potential and actual. We wouldn't say that understanding must be used, but we have some sort of distinction between knowledge as pure and theoretical, and understanding enabling good application. |
23906 | Courage from spirit is natural and unconquerable, as seen in the young [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The courage of spirit is the most natural kind; for spirit is unconquerable, which is why the young are the best fighters. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1229a27) | |
A reaction: [thumos, presumably, as in Plato] I suppose Aristotle knows better than me, but I suspect the young are just the quickest and strongest. I'd rather be led by someone with experience than by someone who is young. |
20204 | Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It makes no difference if the soul is divided into parts or lacks parts, as it certainly has distinct capacities. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1219b32), quoted by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - Virtues of the Mind II 3.1 | |
A reaction: I take this to endorse my view that the mind-body problem is of limited interest to philosophers. The focus should be on what the mind does, not how it is constructed. But then I presume the latter issue is revealed by neuroscience. |
21569 | It is good to generalise truths as much as possible [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is a good thing to generalise any truth as much as possible. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Philosophical Implications of Mathematical logic [1911], p.289) | |
A reaction: An interesting claim, which seems to have a similar status to Ockham's Razor. Its best justification is pragmatic, and concerns strategies for coping with a big messy world. Russell's defence is in 'as much as possible'. |
22506 | A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: All those things that are in man's power either to do or not to do he himself is the cause of, and all those things that he is the cause of are in his own power. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1223a08) | |
A reaction: This is the step which allows us to abandon free will, and replace it with the question of whether a person is the 'cause' of an action. Aristotle carefully delineates the criteria for when an action is within a person's power. Includes failures to act? |
22504 | Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A human being is a starting point of some actions, and he alone of animals; for of nothing else should we say that it acted. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1222b19) | |
A reaction: It is a standard dogma that the idea of free will does not occur in Plato or Aristotle, but this looks awfully like it. I don't agree about animals. You watch them judging whether they can make a leap, and then doing it. |
22510 | Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Many classify even love as involuntary, and certain cases of anger and certain natural states as being too strong for human nature; and we regard them as being pardonable, as being of such a nature as to be constrained by nature. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1225b20) | |
A reaction: Blind terror would presumably count as another such state. An interesting aspect of Aristotle's picture - that human nature contains ingredients that are not part of a natural harmonious whole. |
23913 | Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Pretty much all of the praiseworthy or blameworthy states concerned with character are either excesses, deficiencies, or medial conditions in feelings. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1233b16) | |
A reaction: Suggests that the ideal state of character is the result of long and careful tuning of the feelings - insofar as we can control them. Presumably we can train feelings of hatred or compassion, by appropriate exposures. These states are NOT virtues. |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: Concepts, for Frege, are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.2 | |
A reaction: That sounds awfully like what many philosophers call 'universals'. Frege, as a platonist (at least about numbers), I would take to be in sympathy with that. At least we can say that concepts seem to be properties. |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
Full Idea: Frege had a notorious difficulty over the concept 'horse', when he suggests that if we wish to assert something about a concept, we are obliged to proceed indirectly by speaking of an object that represents it. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], Ch.2.II) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects | |
A reaction: This sounds like the thin end of a wedge. The great champion of objects is forced to accept them here as a façon de parler, when elsewhere they have ontological status. |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
Full Idea: A concept in logic is closely connected with what we call a function. Indeed, we may say at once: a concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value. ..I give the name 'function' to what is meant by the 'unsaturated' part. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.30) | |
A reaction: So a function becomes a concept when the variable takes a value. Problems arise when the value is vague, or the truth-value is indeterminable. |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: For Frege, concepts differ from objects in being inherently incomplete in nature. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This is because they are 'unsaturated', needing a quantified variable to complete the sentence. This could be a pointer towards Quine's view of properties, as simply an intrinsic feature of predication about objects, with no separate identity. |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
Full Idea: From sameness of meaning there does not follow sameness of thought expressed. A fact about the Morning Star may express something different from a fact about the Evening Star, as someone may regard one as true and the other false. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.14) | |
A reaction: This all gets clearer if we distinguish internalist and externalist theories of content. Why take sides on this? Why not just ask 'what is in the speaker's head?', 'what does the sentence mean in the community?', and 'what is the corresponding situation?' |
23918 | Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The discord between the good and the pleasant in one's feelings is lack of self-control. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1237a08) | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of his view, which opposes the view of Socrates that akrasia is a failure of reason or judgement. Goodness seems to be treated here as a feeling, which is unusual. |
22515 | Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Choice is neither simply wish nor opinion, but opinion together with inclination, whenever as a result of deliberation they are brought to a conclusion. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1227a04) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the earliest appearance of the belief-plus-desire theory of action, which is often associated with Hume. A choice does not necessarily result from having the inclination and the appropriate opinion. Laziness! |
22508 | Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In inanimate things the starting-point is single, in animate things there is more than one; for inclination and reason are not always in harmony. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1224a24) | |
A reaction: It is important that this seems to include non-human animals. We see animals avoid something which they desire, presumably because they detect a danger. They may be conflicting desires, but it is rational to prioritise dangers. |
22514 | The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: That part of the soul is deliberative which is capable of discerning a cause: the reason for the sake of which - which is one of the causes - 'cause' being something because-of-which. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1226b26) | |
A reaction: I take because-of-which to be the correct explanation. Since my model of practical reasoning is partly forensic detection, this seems right. Sherlock Holmes spots causes. |
22507 | An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The voluntary consists in action accompanied by thought of some kind. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1224a06) | |
A reaction: This is thought as opposed to inclination or choice. The controlled person [enkrateia] voluntarily acts against inclinations. The appropriate thought receives carefull analysis in NE 1109b30-1111b4. |
23319 | We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, for us to be responsible for what we do, our action has to somehow reflect our motivation. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1224a07) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 2 | |
A reaction: This sounds like 'mens rea' in law - meaning to do the thing you did. But we can obviously be responsible for things through neglect, for example. |
22512 | Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Whatever a man does - not in ignorance, and through his own agency - when it is in his power not to do it, must be voluntary, and that is what voluntary is. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1225b08) | |
A reaction: This is the conclusion of the Eudemian discussion of responsibility. This is a definition by necessary and sufficient conditions. How can you be sure that something is in your power not to do? |
22509 | What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: By these marks we distinguish what comes naturally: everything that is there straightaway as soon as something comes to be, and all that occurs to us if growth is allowed to proceed normally - such as greying hair, ageing, and the like. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1224b32) | |
A reaction: The word 'normal' has to do a lot of work here. Presumably jaundice in a neonate is not included. Or later hereditary diseases. |
18230 | No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If we put together all the things that are ....not done or undergone for their own sake ...no one would choose, in order to have them, to be alive rather than not. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1215), quoted by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Finality' | |
A reaction: Debatable. Roughly his question is whether you would rather be dead than be a slave, since slaves work for means, but have no ends. Aristotle would rather die, but those who surrendered in ancient battles preferred slavery. |
23909 | Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There is intrinsic use of a possession, such as of a shoe or a cloak, and its coincidental use - not of course when using a shoe as a weight, but as, for example, selling it or hiring it out (for then a shoe is used as a shoe). | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1231b37) | |
A reaction: This seems to need a third label, for using the shoe as a weight. 'Inessential use' perhaps, since the intrinsic use points towards the essential nature or function of the shoe. |
5870 | Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is not true that everything that there is seeks some single good: each thing has an inclination for its own good, the eye for sight, the body for health, and so on. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1218a30) | |
A reaction: Aristotle's pluralism. Elsewhere this pluralism arises from his function argument - that the good of each thing is the successful fulfilment of its function, which is different for each thing. This is basic to virtue theory, and has my approval. |
5877 | We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is because it is not easy to discern what sort of choice it is that we are forced to judge from the deeds what sort of person someone is; the activity is more worth having, but the choice is commended more. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1228a15) | |
A reaction: This shows why Aristotle is the most important opponent of consequentialism. It is hard to see how one could praise a self-interested deed simply because it benefited others. Greed is never good. |
5868 | Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: No horse or bird or fish is happy, nor any other thing that there is which does not have a share by its nature in the divine. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1217a26) | |
A reaction: Pet owners will all feel their beloved companions have been insulted, but I agree with this. 'Happy' does not here mean 'in a state of pleasure'. A fully successful bird does little more than the four f's (feed, fornicate, flee, fight). |
5865 | Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: To be happy, and to live the fine and divinely-happy life, would seem to reside in three things above all, ..for some say that wisdom is the greatest good, others virtue, others pleasure. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1214a30) | |
A reaction: Aristotle is well-known for his pluralist answer to this question: virtue is crucial, wisdom is perhaps the greatest of the virtues, and pleasure improves everything in life. |
5876 | Virtue is different from continence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Virtue is different from continence. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1227b17) | |
A reaction: Basic to Aristotle - in that continence leads to right action, but that is not enough for virtue, which requires inner harmony, reason, and pleasure in doing what is right. Hence Aristotle is quite distinct from deontological or consequentialist views. |
5872 | Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Excellence is the best disposition, state or capacity of anything that has some employment or function; this is evident from induction. For example, a cloak has an excellence - and a certain function and employment also; its best state is its excellence. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1219a02) | |
A reaction: 'Employment' will be an assigned function, and 'function' will be a natural or intrinsic function, I presume. This is a nice clear illustration of the fact that for Aristotle virtue runs continuously from people to cloaks. See Idea 1663, though. |
5875 | Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Character (éthos), as the word itself indicates, is developed from habit (ethos). | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1220a36) | |
A reaction: Aristotle goes in for dubious etymologies, but this one sounds quite significant, and supports his view that habit is central to virtue. We would lose nothing in English if we said 'what are her habits?' instead of 'what is her character?'. |
5874 | Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The virtues of character belong to the part that is non-rational, but whose nature is to follow the rational part; we do not say what a man's character is like when we say that he is wise or clever, but when we say that he is gentle or daring. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1220a11) | |
A reaction: In the Nichomachean Ethics it appears that good character is the 'harmony' between the two parts; here it sounds more like obedience. It seems to me that our rational part is a failure if it is not sensitive to the needs of the irrational part. |
22516 | Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Virtue is that state of character which chooses the mean, relative to us, in things pleasant and unpleasant, all those in respect of which a man is said to have a certain sort of character according as he enjoys or suffers pain from them. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1227b08) | |
A reaction: The 'mean' should be understood as what is appropriate, rather than the mere average. Strong anger, for example, is sometimes appropriate. Does Aristotle rule out wild laughter, or frenetic dancing? Is a state of ecstasy wicked? |
22517 | We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is from his choosing that we judge what sort of person someone is; that is, what that for whose sake he does something is, not what he does. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1228a03) | |
A reaction: Not entirely true. It can be sufficient to reveal their character that a person does some particular thing, as novelists know. When Hud parks his car in her flowerbed, we don't need to enquire about his reason. But see 1228a16! |
23914 | People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The mean is more contrary to the extremes than the extremes are to each other, because it does not occur with either of them, whereas the extremes often occur with each other. People can be rash cowards, or wasteful in some things and generous in others. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1234a33) | |
A reaction: This rather undermines the neat visual metaphor of a sliding scale, but gives a more accurate account of the mean. The diagram needs three dimensions, instead of two. |
23911 | Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Each virtue makes its possessor tend to despise great things that are contrary to reason - for example, courage does this of dangers, …a temperate person of many pleasures, and a generous one of many sorts of wealth. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1232a37) | |
A reaction: I like the observation that the generous tend to despise wealth, implying that those who love wealth tend to lack generosity. Christianity has encouraged us to reject the idea of despising anything - but that seems to iron out common sense values. |
23910 | Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: All the virtues will follow along with greatness of soul, or it will follow along with all of them | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1232a36) | |
A reaction: This is obviously similar in some respects to Nietzsche's 'higher' man, though that suggests greater independence, rather than being an ideal citizen. |
23908 | If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If someone looks at a beautiful statue, or horse, or human being, or listens to someone singing …just to look at or listen to beautiful things, he would not be thought to be intemperate, any more than those beguiled by the Sirens would. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1230b31) | |
A reaction: He says that intemperance mainly concerns taste and touch, rather than mere looking or listening. I think obsessive collectors of beautiful objects might drift into intemperance. |
23905 | Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Courage is a following of reason, and reason orders us to choose what is noble. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1229a01) | |
A reaction: This sounds right to me. Courage, in all sorts of contexts, seems to arise in people who sustain their focus on what is the right thing to do. |
23912 | Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It makes a difference whether the honour comes from many random people or from those worthy of note, and again so does by whom and for what the honor is conferred. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1232b18) | |
A reaction: He tends to play down honour because of its relativism, but this quotation implies that if an honour was bestowed by the worthy, for something of agreed high value, then it would be at quite a different level from mere popular esteem. Celebrity v peerage? |
5871 | Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: All goods are either in the soul or outside it, and it is those in the soul that are more worthy of choice; for wisdom, virtue and pleasure are in the soul, and some or all of these seem to be an end for everyone. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1218b34) | |
A reaction: An interesting reason for this assertion - that it is true because everybody agrees on it. See Idea 95. I would think that he might claim that our soul is our essence, whereas external goods pander to the non-essential in us. |
23919 | Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Just as if people wish to be healthy they do not become healthy, so if they wish to be friends they are not immediately in fact friends. …[1237b40] For a friend is not to be had without a test or in a single day, but needs time. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1237b21) | |
A reaction: The voice of experience, I think. Obviously trust is basic, and it would be unwise to trust a possible friend on the first day. Since politics aims at friendship, I presume the support of the rule of law helps to achieve trust. |
23920 | Decent people can be friends with base people [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is possible for a decent person to be friends with a base one. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1238b01) | |
A reaction: This is on the basis of being useful, or of having something in common. Presumably friendship can come in degrees, as well as being of different kinds. Even the finest people can differ a lot, and only have a limited friendship. |
23915 | The main function of politics is to produce friendship [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It seems to be most of all the function of politics to produce friendship. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1245b22) | |
A reaction: Lovely! Most people would probably cite wealth and security as the main aims. This function seems to require quite a high degree of equality, though Aristotle doesn't think it essential. |
23916 | The best cure for mutual injustice is friendship [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If one wishes to make it so that people do not commit injustices to each other, it is enough to make them friends; for true friends do not commit injustice. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1245b28) | |
A reaction: This, along with Idea 23915, offers a beautiful vision of what a society should try to achieve. There can be duplicitous apparent friends, but on the whole the best way to cure unjust relations is friendship. Imagine Jews and Arabs being friends (2023). |
5866 | It is folly not to order one's life around some end [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Not to have ordered one's life in relation to some end is a mark of extreme folly. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1214b10) | |
A reaction: A most interesting claim, not found in the Nichomachean Ethics. There the teleology is descriptive, but here it is prescriptive. It is tempting to rebel against Aristotle's injuncture. He was a driven workaholic. Why not float through life like gossamer? |
5878 | Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One might wonder if it is possible to use each thing both for its natural purpose and otherwise - and that as itself or incidentally. E.g. twisting an eye so that one thing appears two, but also using an eye as something to sell or eat. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1246a26) | |
A reaction: The important idea here is the core notion that there is a 'natural' purpose. Sceptics might say that all purposes derive from how a mind wishes to use something; otherwise there would be processes, but no 'functions' or 'purposes'. |
5873 | Each thing's function is its end [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Each thing's function is its end. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1219a08) | |
A reaction: Function and end are not the same, but this confirms how closely related they are for Aristotle. Can an inanimate object have an end, without having any apparent function? Could I construct a set of cogwheels which each had a function, but no end? |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |
Full Idea: The ontological proof of God's existence suffers from the fallacy of treating existence as a first-level concept. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.38 n) | |
A reaction: [See Idea 8490 for first- and second-order functions] This is usually summarised as the idea that existence is a quantifier rather than a predicate. |