6 ideas
13655 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that whether all sets are constructible is indeterminate [Putnam, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Putnam claims that the Löwenheim-Skolem theorems indicate that there is no 'fact of the matter' whether all sets are constructible. | |
From: report of Hilary Putnam (Models and Reality [1977]) by Stewart Shapiro - Foundations without Foundationalism | |
A reaction: [He refers to the 4th and 5th pages of Putnam's article] Shapiro offers (p.109) a critique of Putnam's proposal. |
9915 | V = L just says all sets are constructible [Putnam] |
Full Idea: V = L just says all sets are constructible. L is the class of all constructible sets, and V is the universe of all sets. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Models and Reality [1977], p.425) |
9913 | The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem is close to an antinomy in philosophy of language [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem says that a satisfiable first-order theory (in a countable language) has a countable model. ..I argue that this is not a logical antinomy, but close to one in philosophy of language. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Models and Reality [1977], p.421) | |
A reaction: See the rest of this paper for where he takes us on this. |
16886 | The truth of an axiom must be independently recognisable [Frege] |
Full Idea: It is part of the concept of an axiom that it can be recognised as true independently of other truths. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (On Euclidean Geometry [1900], 183/168), quoted by Tyler Burge - Frege on Knowing the Foundations 4 | |
A reaction: Frege thinks the axioms of arithmetic all reside in logic. |
9914 | It is unfashionable, but most mathematical intuitions come from nature [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Experience with nature is undoubtedly the source of our most basic 'mathematical intuitions', even if it is unfashionable to say so. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Models and Reality [1977], p.424) | |
A reaction: Correct. I find it quite bewildering how Frege has managed to so discredit all empirical and psychological approaches to mathematics that it has become a heresy to say such things. |
9591 | The human intellect has not been, and cannot be, fully formalized [Nagel/Newman] |
Full Idea: The resources of the human intellect have not been, and cannot be, fully formalized. | |
From: E Nagel / JR Newman (Gödel's Proof [1958], VIII) | |
A reaction: This conclusion derives from Gödel's Theorem. Some people (e.g. Penrose) get over-excited by this discovery, and conclude that the human mind is supernatural. Imagination is the key - it is a feature of rationality that escapes mechanization. |